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Electronic Warfare missions are often dangerous and risky. Mounting Electronic 
Warfare equipment on a UAS and using it to conduct the EW mission is the most rational 
solution, since it does not endanger human life.  
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equipment. These two technologies can be integrated into a single mission over the net-
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required to use these integrated technologies more effectively. 
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are used for both defensive and offensive 
purposes. Different sizes and capabilities of UAS support a variety of different 
applications. Improved networking capabilities have enlarged the boundaries of UAS 
operations.  We know that it is cheaper and less dangerous to use UAS in many missions 
formerly reserved for manned aircraft. 
Electronic Warfare (EW) maintains a predominant position in today’s highly 
technological warfare environment. We cannot even conceive of a battle without using 
Electronic Warfare and related tactics. Electronic Warfare has become one of the most 
important divisions of modern warfare.   
The net-centric battlefield environment exhibits merging points between UAS and 
Electronic Warfare, and using this relationship we can improve the effectiveness of both. 
Employment of UAS for EW is not new, and in fact is becoming more common. As is 
clear from the title of this thesis: “General Use of UAS in an EW Environment—EW 
Concepts and Tactics for Single or Multiple UAS Over the Net-Centric Battlefield,” this 
author’s primary focus is to analyze the operational and strategic utility of UAS in 
relation to Electronic Warfare, with consideration for networking and the different types 
of UAS. This thesis research generally seeks to identify the concepts for employment of 
UAS for Electronic Warfare and examines how they have changed, and will continue to 
change strategies and combat tactics. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• This study will research the answers to the following questions: 
• What are the merging points between UAS and EW? 
• How did Electronic Warfare evolve in the last century? 
• How can we use UAS more effectively for EW purposes? 
• What roles are appropriate for UAS in pre- and post-war periods? 
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• What are the benefits of using UAS in the net-centric battle area? 
• What is the effect of networking capabilities of UAS on tactics and 
concepts of general use of UAS in EW? 
• While running a scenario, can we determine what kind of missions can be 
accomplished by UAS? 
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
This study will be a broad guide to UAS employment for EW purposes.  After 
collecting the necessary information and data, I will close my thesis with a combat 
scenario that will permit readers to visualize proper employment of UAS in a net-centric 
EW environment. This will further illuminate possible concepts and tactics that can be 
applied in the future. 
C. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study can be used as a guide for interaction of UAS tactics and classic 
offensive and defensive aircraft tactics.  
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis research and findings will be organized in the following manner: 
1. Introduction 
2. General Description of EW 
In this chapter, I discuss and describe EW and its subdivisions, according to U.S. 
doctrine: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Warfare Support (ES), and Electronic 
Protection (EP). I will give examples for each of these. I will also define other elements 
of Electronic Warfare, such as the electromagnetic spectrum, operational electromagnetic 
energy, directed energy, and so on. Moreover, I will discuss the EW effects and tenets. In 
the second part of this chapter I will define the relationship between Electronic Warfare 
and Information Warfare (IW), since EW is a pillar of IO. Finally I will talk about the 
major activities which can be achieved by EW. 
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3. History of EW 
In Chapter III, I will research the history of EW, starting with elements of EW 
from before the First World War. This chapter is divided into four main categories: 
1. Before and during the First World War 
2. From 1919 to the end of the Second World War 
3. From 1946 through the First Gulf War 
4. Korean War (1950–1953)  
5. Vietnam War (1959–1975) 
6. Yom Kippur (1973) and the Bekaa Valley (1982) 
7. The First Gulf War (Operation DESERT STORM) 
8. From the First Gulf War to the present 
9. Operation ALLIED FORCE (1999) 
10. The War in Afghanistan (2001-Present) 
11. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2003-Present) 
4. General Information About UAS 
Chapter IV will include important information and definitions about UAS, to 
include classification of UAS. UAS networking will be discussed. I will start this chapter 
by explaining why we need UAS.  Current and future military and civilian roles and 
applications will also be discussed in this chapter. 
5. History of UAS 
In this chapter, I will research the history of UAS. The chapter will be divided 
into seven main categories starting with the origins of the UAS concept. 




3. Interwar Years 
4. WWII 
5. Post-World War II, Through Pre-Vietnam 
a. Surface-to-surface Cruise Missiles 
b. Decoy Missiles 
c. Standoff Cruise Missiles 
d. Anti-ship Cruise Missiles 
e. Photo Reconnaissance UAVs 
6. Vietnam Through Desert Storm 
7. Desert Storm Through Present 
6. Merging Points of EW and UAS 
This chapter will be a synthesis of the first four chapters. This chapter also will be 
the main step to determine the possible EW tactics for single or multiple UAS over the 
net-centric battlefield.  
• What are the merging points between UAS and EW? 
• How can we use UAS more effectively for EW purposes? 
The questions above will be thoroughly answered in this chapter. They will lead 
to a reasonable solution. Furthermore, I will research EW UAS payloads. At the end of 
this chapter I will discuss international EW UAS programs. 
7. Possible Tactics and Concepts of UAS in the Net-centric Battle Area 
Using the information from the Chapter VI, my experience with UAS in the 
COASTS program, and my knowledge as a fighter pilot, I will produce possible 




After examining tactics in the previous chapter, I will describe and run a scenario 
on Falcon View. 
9. Conclusions and Recommendations 
In this chapter, I will conclude my thesis and discuss the possibility of using the 
tactics and concept that I came up with in the previous chapters. Finally, I will make 

























II. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EW 
Control of the EM spectrum can have a major impact on the success of 
military operations across the levels of conflict. Proper employment of 
EW enhances the ability of U.S. operational commanders to achieve 
objectives. EW is a force multiplier. EW operates on multiple levels of a 
conflict, from self-protection to operational attack plans. When EW 
actions are properly integrated with other military operations, a synergistic 
effect is achieved, losses minimized, and effectiveness enhanced. [1] 
 A. MAIN DEFINITIONS RELATED TO ELECTRONIC WARFARE 
The definitions given in this section are necessary for a thorough understanding.  
1. Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)  
EMS is the range of frequencies of EM radiation from zero to infinity [2]. 
“Control of the electromagnetic spectrum is an essential and critical objective in the 
success of today’s military operations and is applicable at all levels of conflict.” [1] 
2. Electromagnetic Environment (EME)  
EME is used for the resulting product of the power and time distribution, in 
various frequency ranges, of the radiated or conducted EM emission levels that may be 
encountered by a military force, system, or platform when performing its assigned 
mission in its intended operational environment. It is the sum of electromagnetic 
interference (EMI); EM pulse; hazards of EM radiation to personnel, ordnance, and 





Figure 1.   Electromagnetic Spectrum (From [2]) 
 




3. Electronic Warfare (EW)  
EW is the use of the EMS to deny the use of this medium by an enemy, while 
optimizing its use by friendly forces [5]. It can be also defined as a military action whose 
objective is control of the EMS. The three main subdivisions are Electronic Attack (EA), 










Figure 3.   Electronic Warfare Subdivisions (From[4]) 
 
4. Electronic Attack (EA)  
EA is the use of the EMS to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment in order to 
degrade, neutralize, or destroy an enemy’s capabilities [2]. “EA also prevents or reduces 
an enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum. It can be accomplished through 
detection, denial, disruption, deception and destruction, but relies heavily on detection.” 
[1] 
EA can be either active or passive.  Jamming, deception, active cancellation, and 
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) are used for Active EA. On the other hand, Passive EA 




Hard-kill and soft-kill aspects play an important role in EA. While jamming and 
deception are considered soft-kill measures, anti-radiation missiles are naturally 
considered as hard-kill mediums due to the purpose of damaging or destroying radar 
antennas and equipment [4]. 
5. Electronic Protection (EP)  
EP is the subdivision of EW that includes passive and active means to protect 
personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of 
EW that degrade, neutralize or destroy friendly combat capability [6]. 
Active EP includes such activities as technical modifications to radio equipment, 
such as the ARC-164, which is a military UHF AM radio that operates between 225-400 
MHz and uses frequency-hopping spread spectrum technology. Have Quick operations 
are widely used for EP purposes [7]. The education of operators and modified battlefield 
tactics or operations can be considered as Passive EP [5]. 
Examples for EP include spectrum management, EM hardening, emission control 
(EMCON), use of wartime reserve modes (WARM), frequency agility and changing 
PRF.  “Integration of EP and other security measures can prevent enemy detection, 
denial, disruption, deception or destruction. Friendly force reliance on advanced 
technology demands EP safeguards.” [1] 
6. Electronic Warfare Support (ES)  
ES is the subdivision of EW that is used for searching for, intercepting, 
identifying, and locating or localizing sources of intentional and unintentional radiated 
EM energy for threat recognition, targeting, and planning for an immediate action. ES 
includes the information for decisions involving EW operations and other tactical actions 
such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing (JP 3-51).  ES is used to provide near 
real-time information to supplement information from other intelligence sources. 
Moreover, a more accurate picture of the battle space can be provided by correlation of 
ES data with other ISR information. This information is vital for situational awareness 
and developing new countermeasures, and affects the overall mission. “ES data can be 
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used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), which includes communications 
intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT).” As is obvious from the 
name, ES provides information required for EW planning and operational purposes. “It 
allows for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical 
actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing.” Because of ES’s passive nature, 
it may also be deployed during peacetime [1]. 
7. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support 
Even though electronic forms of intelligence gathering (SIGINT, Measurement 
and Signature Intelligence [MASINT], and other forms) and ES seem like they are being 
used for the same purposes, actually there is a significant distinction between intelligence 
and ES, based upon who tasks or controls the intelligence assets and what they are 
supposed to provide, and most importantly by their purpose. Intelligence gathering 
comprises the main part of the day-to-day activities of the intelligence community. On 
the other hand, ES is a part of the intelligence process that is often referred to as combat 
information, which requires immediate action (i.e., Airborne Warning and Control 
System passive detection system). An operational commander controls or tasks the assets 
for the achievement of ES. These assets include efforts to search for, intercept, identify, 
and locate or localize sources of radiated EM energy. The most important purpose of ES 
tasking is immediate threat recognition for the planning and conduct of future operations, 
and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. ES is intended 
to respond to an immediate operational requirement.  
In the meantime, these assets and resources can simultaneously collect 
intelligence for information gathering purposes. Data collected by ES systems can be 
used as SIGINT, ELINT, etc. “This is not to say that data collected for intelligence 
cannot meet immediate operational requirements. Intelligence collected for ES purposes 
is normally also processed by the appropriate parts of the intelligence community for 
further exploitation after the operational commander’s ES requirements are met.” [6] 
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The radar warning receiver is the best example of ES. It provides necessary 
information about the enemy’s radar systems, which are potentially deadly for friendly 
forces, and allows the pilot to take immediate action against the incoming threat. Another 
example may be the EP-3 monitoring of Iraqi communications networks to identify 
which nodes appeared to be critical, and to determine the value each node adds to its 
corresponding network.  
8. Directed Energy (DE) in EW  
DE is an umbrella term covering technologies that relate to the production 
of a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic 
particles. [1] 
Directed-energy warfare (DEW) is military action that involves the use of DE 
weapons, devices, and countermeasures. It is used for causing damage or destruction of 
an adversary’s equipment, facilities, and personnel. It may also be used to determine, 
exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the EM spectrum. DE can be deployed to protect 
friendly equipment, facilities, and personnel [8]. 
Some applications of DE can be used in all areas of EW: laser, radio frequency, 
and particle beam. DE can be used as a means of EA, ES, or EP. A laser designed to 
blind an optical sensor is an example of DE use in EA. A warning receiver designed to 
detect and analyze a laser signal is considered ES. If a visor or goggle is utilized to filter 
out the harmful wavelength of laser light, this is obviously EP [1]. 
B. EW EFFECTS 
Detection—“Assesses the electromagnetic environment to include radar/radio 
frequency, electro-optics/laser, and infrared spectrums using active and passive means.” 
[1]. The first step in EW is detection, because effective detection of the electromagnetic 
environment is essential to develop an accurate electronic order of battle (EOB). EOB is 
critical to meet mission objectives and for decision making. There are different means of 
detection. On-board receivers, space-based systems, UAS, human intelligence 
(HUMINT), and other ISR systems are some of these means. Detection can be used in 
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EA, EP, and ES, and it enables the avoidance of known hostile systems when possible. 
When avoidance is not possible, it may be necessary to deny, deceive, disrupt, or destroy 
the enemy’s electronic systems [1]. 
Denial—“Controls the information an adversary receives and prevents the 
adversary from gaining accurate information about friendly forces.” [1]. For example, 
traditional noise jamming techniques, which are designed to block communications 
channels or radar scope presentations, can be used for denial. Advanced electronic 
deception techniques or destructive measures are also used for denial. The EC-130H 
COMPASS CALL is a very good denial example of a communications jamming weapon 
[1]. 
Deception—“Utilizes the electromagnetic spectrum to confuse or mislead an 
adversary.” One objective of EW is to cause deception in decision-making processes 
through the use of the electromagnetic spectrum by the enemy, and to make it difficult to 
distinguish between reality and the perception of reality. Misleading and confusing the 
adversary’s electromagnetic sensors is one of the main methods for the achievement of 
the mission.  Multi-sensor deception can increase the adversary's confidence about the 
"plausibility" of the deception story.  
Electromagnetic deception as it applies to EW is the deliberate radiation, 
re-radiation, alteration, suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or 
reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to convey misleading 
information to an enemy or to enemy EM-dependent weapons, thereby 
degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability. [9] 
Deception jammers/transmitters can be used to place false targets on the enemy 
radar’s scope or cause the enemy radar to evaluate incorrectly target speed, range, or 
azimuth. These jammers/transmitters generally operate by receiving the pulse of energy 
from the radar, amplifying it, delaying or multiplying it, and reradiating the altered signal 
back to the enemy’s transmitting radar.  
1. Types of Electromagnetic Deception 
• Manipulative Electromagnetic Deception 
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• Simulative Electromagnetic Deception 
• Imitative Electromagnetic Deception 
 
“Manipulative EM deception involves an action to eliminate revealing or to 
convey misleading EM telltale indicators that may be used by hostile forces.” [2] By 
transmitting a simulated unique system signature from a nonlethal platform, adversary 
sensors are misled to receive and catalog those systems as real threats.  
Low observable technology, commonly known as “Stealth,” is a form of passive 
manipulative electromagnetic deception. Through stealth, the threat radar is passively 
manipulated or denied reception of proper return pulses, which cause a misperception of 
the target size or presence of the aircraft. EM deception causes the enemy to lose their 
EW effectiveness.  
“Simulative electromagnetic deception is action to simulate friendly, notional, or 
actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces.” [1] The use of chaff is an excellent example 
of simulative electromagnetic deception. Chaff places false targets on the radar display so 
that the enemy thinks that a larger strike package is attacking. Deceptive techniques that 
mislead an adversary’s target tracking radar by using a jammer/transmitter to prevent the 
enemy from finding the true location of its target is another example of this type of 
deception. 
“Imitative EM deception introduces EM energy into enemy systems that imitate 
enemy emissions.” [1] Repeater jamming techniques that imitate enemy radar pulses is 
the best example for imitative EM deception. These pulses send incorrect target 
information to the enemy’s radar systems [9]. 
Other examples of deception include IR deception involving manipulation 
of infrared signatures; radar deception consisting of re-radiation of signals 
through the use of reflectors, transponders, or repeaters; and optical 
deception by manipulation of the optical region of the EM spectrum 
through the use of aerosols, mists, etc. These techniques may be employed 
individually or in combination. In general, EW deception planning 
determines how to use EM means to mislead the adversary and create an 
advantage for friendly forces. [1]  
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Disruption—“Degrades or interferes with the enemy’s control of its forces in 
order to limit attacks on friendly forces.” [1] For disruption electronic jamming, 
electronic deception, electronic intrusion, and destruction means can be used.  
Destruction—“Eliminates some or all of an adversary’s electronic defenses.” [1] 
Destruction is the most permanent and the most effective countermeasure. With the 
destruction of a system, the enemy will be unable to use this system and they will need to 
replace, repair or support it by moving forces in a period of time. Target tracking radars 
and command and control are high value targets because their destruction seriously 
hampers the enemy’s effectiveness. The first priority is to determine the exact location of 
the target that is supposed to be destroyed. ES plays an important role for precise 
localization. Pinpointing the location can be accomplished by onboard receivers and 
direction finding equipment. A variety of weapons and techniques can be used for 
destroying the enemy EM systems. Anti-radiation missiles are for a prime example a 
destruction asset. 
C. EW TENETS 
According to Joint Publication 3-13.1, EW has three tenets: are control, exploit 
and enhance. 
Control.  The domination of the electromagnetic spectrum, directly or indirectly, 
so that friendly forces may attack the adversary and protect themselves from exploitation 
or attack.  
Exploit. Use of the electromagnetic spectrum to the advantage of friendly forces. 
Enhance. Use of EW as a force multiplier 
D. ELECTRONIC WARFARE’S RELATIONSHIP TO INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS (IO) 
IO consists of EW, computer network operations (CNO), PSYOP, military 
deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in relation with specified 
supporting and related capabilities. IO influences, disrupts, corrupts, or usurps adversarial 
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human and automated decision making ability while protecting our own. Information 
assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence (CI), and combat 
camera (COMCAM) are the supporting capabilities of IO. Public affairs (PA), civil 
military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) are the 
related capabilities of IO. 
By using offensive and defensive tactics and techniques in a variety of 
combinations to shape, disrupt, and exploit adversarial use of the EMS while protecting 
friendly freedom of action in that spectrum, EW contributes to IO. While the reliance on 
the EMS extends for a wide range, this increases both the potential and the challenges of 
EW in IO. The increasing prevalence of wireless telephone and computer usage extends 
both the utility and threat of EW, and it should not be forgotten that the enemy has the 
same opportunities and EW should protect our own from similar exploitation [2]. 
Within the information operations (IO) construct, EW is an element of 
information warfare; more specifically, it is an element of offensive and 
defensive counter information. EW considerations must be coordinated 
into IO and fully integrated into operations in order to be effective. [1] 
 
 
Figure 4.   Electronic Warfare’s Relationship to Information Operations (IO) (From [1]) 
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E. THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES PERFORMED IN EW 
Put simply, the principal function of EW is to exploit the opportunities and 
vulnerabilities that the physics of electromagnetic energy dictate [6]. Table 1 shows the 
basic capabilities that are used in the realm of EW. To achieve the ultimate objective of 
the EW mission and the military campaign, these capabilities should be well-coordinated 
and integrated.  
 
Table 1.   The Principle Activities of Electronic Warfare (From [3]) 
1 EM Compatibility 
 
9 Electronic Probing 
2 EM Deception 10 Electronic Reconnaissance 
 
3 EM Hardening 11 Electronic Intelligence 
 
4 EM Interference 12 Electronics Security 
 
5 EM Intrusion 13 Electronic Warfare Reprogramming 
 
6 EM Jamming 14 Emission Control (EMCON) 
 








All of the activities above are explained in detail in Air Force Doctrine Document 
2-5.1 and are summarized below. 
 
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) is the ability of systems that work 
throughout the EMS to operate in their intended operational environments without any 
degradation due to EM radiation or response. The application of sound EMS 
management—system, equipment, and device design configuration—ensures 
interference-free operation; clear concepts and doctrines that maximize operational 
effectiveness are considered EMC.  
Electromagnetic Deception is the utilization of the electromagnetic spectrum to 
confuse or mislead an adversary. One objective of EW is to cause deception in decision-
making processes through the use of the electromagnetic spectrum by the enemy, and to 
make it difficult to distinguish between reality and the perception of reality. Misleading 
and confusing the adversary’s electromagnetic sensors is one of the main methods for the 
accomplishment of the mission.  
Electromagnetic Hardening. Filtering, attenuating, grounding, bonding, and 
shielding against undesirable effects of EM energy are the most commonly used actions 
taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment. This is considered EM hardening. 
Electromagnetic Interference. Any EM disturbance that interrupts, obstructs, or 
degrades the effective performance of electronics or electrical equipment is considered 
EMI. This can be either induced intentionally, as in some forms of EW, or 
unintentionally, as a result of emissions, responses, and intermodulation products. 
Electromagnetic Intrusion is the intentional insertion of EM energy into 
transmission paths in order to deceive operators or to confuse them. 
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Electromagnetic Jamming is used for reducing enemy EW capability by 
disrupting their use of the EMS with the intent of degrading the enemy’s combat 
capability. Radiation, re-radiation, or reflections of EM energy for this purpose are some 
examples of EM Jamming. 
Electromagnetic Pulse is a strong pulse, which causes damage to electrical or 
electronic systems by producing current and voltage surges. 
Electronic Masking is a defensive measure in which radiation of EM energy on 
friendly frequencies is controlled in order to protect the emissions of friendly 
communications and electronic systems against ES measures or signals intelligence 
(SIGINT) of the adversary. One of the most difficult considerations in Electronic 
Masking is not causing any significant degradation in the operation of friendly systems. 
Electronic Probing is intentional radiation applied to devices or systems of 
potential enemies to learn their functions and operational capabilities. 
Electronic Reconnaissance is the detection, location, identification, and 
evaluation of foreign EM emissions. 
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) is the technical and geolocational intelligence 
that is collected from foreign EM emissions. 
Electronics Security is used to keep unauthorized persons away from valuable 
information. This is a means of information protection that might be derived from the 
interception and study of non-communications EM radiations, e.g., radar. 
Electronic Warfare Reprogramming, as the name indicates, is the deliberate 
alteration or modification of EW or target sensing systems (TSSs). This is done for 
validated changes in equipment, tactics, or the EME. Deliberate actions on the part of 
friendly, adversary, or third parties or may be brought about by EMI, or other inadvertent 
phenomena can be the reason for these modifications and alterations. The purpose of this 
action is to maintain the effectiveness of EW equipment according to the changing EME. 
Changes to self-defense systems, offensive weapons systems, and intelligence collection 
systems are also included in EW reprogramming.  
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Emission Control (EMCON) is the selective and controlled use of EM, acoustic, 
or other emitters by minimizing the use of the systems, to protect them from 
countermeasures and optimize C2 capabilities for the security of the mission. There are 
different types of EMCON that dictates which equipment to use throughout the operation. 
When the security of the operations increases, higher levels of EMCON restricts the 
duration and use of more equipment.  
Spectrum Management involves planning, coordinating, and managing use of 
the EMS through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures. The main 
objective of spectrum management is to enable electronic systems to work in harmony 





III. HISTORY OF EW 
Contrary to common perceptions, the history of electronic warfare actually begins 
earlier than the Second World War. In fact, we can see the use of electronic warfare as 
early as 1861 in the U.S. Civil War. After the invention of the telegraph by Samuel F.B. 
Morse in 1837, telegraphy became the primary means of communication; overland cables 
became widespread. With the coming of the Civil War in 1861, therefore, telegraph wires 
became one of the most important targets for cavalry. Because Union forces used the 
telegraph extensively, they had more problems with these cavalry raids than the 
Confederate forces. Confederate cavalry switched military telegraph traffic to the wrong 
destinations, transmitted false orders to Union commanders, and cut the wires to deny 
information to Union forces [10]. The cavalry of both sides tried to disrupt the other 
side’s ability to employ effective communication. These tactics are the first examples of 
signals intelligence, jamming, and deception [12].  
Strictly speaking, the above is not an example of electronic warfare (since the 
telegraph does not radiate electromagnetic energy). However, it is important to 
understand these early counter-C3I (command, control, communications, and 
intelligence) tactics as they relate to modern EW techniques.  
A. BEFORE AND DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
In 1897, Guglielmo Marconi sent and received wireless radio frequency signals 
over a distance of more than two miles. In 1899, Marconi increased the transmission 
distance to 89 miles [11]. With this increased range, radio use became practical for 
marine communications. EW employment followed almost immediately. Surprisingly, 
deliberate jamming was first used for civilian purposes during the America’s Cup yacht 
races in 1901 in the United States. In September 1901, Marconi made a contract with 
Associated Press to provide radio coverage of the race. The Wireless Telegraph Company 
of America also secured a contract. The American Wireless Telephone and Telegraph Co. 
couldn’t find a sponsor. They decided to exploit the situation and used a more powerful 
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transmitter than the other companies. John Pickard, who was one of American Wireless 
Telephone and Telegraph Co.’s engineers, found a way to jam signals from the other 
companies by overpowering them with the stronger signal, leaving AWT&T as the only 
company able to pass accurate reports on the races [11].  
Shortly thereafter, the British initiated the first intentional use of radio jamming. 
This happened in 1902 during the Royal Navy’s fleet exercises in the Mediterranean. The 
U.S. Navy first used EW in 1903 during their maneuvers [10].  In the Russo-Japanese 
War (1904–1905), the Russians used radio jamming to obtain tactical advantage. This 
war is significant for being the first war in which both sides used radio. During the Port 
Arthur bombardment, Russian operators heard Japanese signals and used a spark 
transmitter to jam. Hence, damage and casualties sustained by Russian forces were much 
lower than they could have been. 
From 1905 to 1914, there were significant improvements in Wireless Telegraphy 
(WT) systems; the transmission distance was increased. Bandwidth requirements were 
reduced, thereby accommodating more discrete channels. Mutual interference was also 
reduced. Transmitter and receiver technology was advanced with improved reception 
capability. WT was placed into aircraft, a milestone in air-ground communications [10]. 
In 1906, the U.S. Navy installed the first direction finder (DF) onto a ship for testing; it 
had a limited capability [10]. 
In World War I, many nations deployed radio jamming. At the beginning of 1915, 
the Royal Navy built a chain of DF stations along the east coast of England for the 
purpose of locating ships or aircraft by their bearing [10]. 
Air-ground communications played a big role during World War I, primarily in 
support of reconnaissance. There was little deliberate jamming; most of the jamming was 
because of friendly aircraft flying too closely together [12]. 
The importance of encrypting a message was better understood after the German 
victory over the Russians at Tannenberg. Russian headquarters were not using encrypted 
communications, permitting interception by the Germans. Knowing the enemy’s next 
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moves provided an advantage to the Germans, and contributed to a crushing Russian 
defeat [11]. At sea, German U-boats created difficulties for Allied ships. Allied wireless 
intelligence was used to counter this. However, tracking German submarines was not 
easy. After the U.S. Navy installed wireless DF for anti-submarine warfare, the Allied 
wireless intelligence service was able to track almost all German submarines around the 
world. The Germans minimized their communications traffic, but this proved ineffective 
against Allied forces [11]. 
B. FROM 1919 TO THE END OF SECOND WORLD WAR 
Between the two world wars, significant developments took place in electronic 
engineering. Improvements in radio navigation aids and radar allowed them to play major 
roles in WWII. EW became more important because of these new technologies [11]. 
Scientists found new ways of reception and transmission in the higher frequencies. RT 
systems became smaller and lighter and began to be used in short-range communications. 
After World War I, the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) worked on 
intercommunications between ships, aircraft, and ground units. In 1926, NRL focused on 
avoiding enemy detection and detecting enemy transmissions, creating interference for 
the enemy. 
In the early 1930s, we see the initial development of Radio Detection and 
Ranging (RADAR) [10]. NRL developed an “interference detector” which was able to 
detect signals in 1932; they increased the range to 50 miles by 1934. Great Britain and 
Germany were working on the same technology. In 1935, the British detected an aircraft 
at 17 miles with pulsed radar operating at 11 MHz, and in 1936 they extended the range 
to 75 miles. The Germans detected an aircraft at 12 miles with radar operating at 600 
MHz. The U.S. used a 200 MHz XAF radar to detect an aircraft at 100 miles and ships at 
15 miles. 
After noting these improvements in radar technology, experts started to try to 
deny or defeat radar. The first airborne jamming test was performed in London, using a 
continuous wave transmitter. Soon thereafter, the British placed anti-jamming technology 
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into the Chain Home radar systems along the coast of England. The Chain Home was the 
first operational air defense radar system in the world. “These anti-jamming systems were 
the first examples of electronic counter counter-measures (ECCM).” [10] 
The first use of airborne electronic intelligence (ELINT) took place in 1939. The 
German Graf Zeppelin performed an ELINT mission while flying over the east coast of 
England. It intercepted, recorded, and assessed the potential radiation threat to the 
German Air Force.  
The outbreak of World War II found the U.S. experimenting with and developing new 
equipment: radars, high frequency direction finding (HFDF) systems, and anti-jamming 
devices.  
“1940 was the year of the ‘Battle of the Beams’ for Germany and the United 
Kingdom (UK). Using radio navigation systems, one of which was called Knickebein, the 
Germans acquired an accurate night bombing capability over ranges of up to 200 nautical 
miles (NM). This was a development originally generated using the German Lorenz 
Company’s “blind approach” navigation system.” Pilots navigated by using the dots and 
dashes that were created by two different transmitters. Following the overlapping dashes 
and dots, pilots were able to navigate accurately at night and under instrument 
meteorological conditions (IMC). The British made some modifications to their systems 
and were able to jam the Lorenz Beams, thus severely reducing German nighttime 
bombing accuracy. After this event, they came up with “Y” radio monitoring stations and 
integrated countermeasures into them. The British survived a potentially devastating 
German advantage through early recognition of the Lorenz system and using the correct 
measures against it.  
Following this, the British developed the Mandrel. This was an airborne radar 
noise jammer. It was developed to counter Freya radars, which were used for early 
warning against the British by Germany. The Freya was used to determine formation size 
and range information.  
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Following 1944, programs in the U.S., Great Britain, Japan, Germany, and the 
Soviet Union placed radar on aircraft. In Europe, the frequency range of Freya radars was 
increased and its jamming susceptibility was reduced by spreading its power to degrade 
the effectiveness of Mandrel. “At this point, a new kind of counter-measure against radar 
came into play: chaff, or “window” as the British called it (the German’s referred to it as 
’duppel‘).” [11] Chaff is basically narrow metallic strips of various lengths and frequency 
responses designed to act as tiny reflectors. Like an anti-radar smoke screen that masks a 
target, chaff deceives enemy radar systems. It is a half-wave dipole that causes the radar 
signal to reflect back to the source; thus, it creates an echo that deceives or hides the 
target. Chaff was extremely effective against German radars [11].  
Chaff was released in bundles. When these opened in the air, they caused false 
target echoes. The dispersion of the chaff depended upon altitude, weather, and speed. 
“EW became a cat-and-mouse game as the pendulum swung from EP to EA and back to 
EA.” [12] It was a constant game of measures (EM), countermeasures (ECM), and 
counter-countermeasures (ECCM). 
 





Figure 6.   A Limber Freya Radar 
 
Figure 7.   A Pole Freya Radar 
 
EW was also employed in the Pacific after the end of the war in Europe, but there 
were no real major developments.  
C. FROM 1946 TO THE FIRST GULF WAR 
The most significant advances in electronic warfare occurred after the Second 
World War. 
After World War II, development of the U.S. electronic attack slowed until the 
beginning of the Cold War. As the Soviet threat grew, the U.S. had to know its enemy. 
Americans started working on their electronic intelligence (ELINT) capabilities [12]. 
1. Korean War (1950–1953) to Vietnam  
The U.S. flew 100 B-29 Superfortress heavy bomber aircraft during the Korean 
War. The North Korean Air Force had nothing to counter them with until China joined 
North Korea and brought MiG-15 jet fighters with them, deployed to airfields in nearby 
Manchuria. North Korea also used early-warning radars and radar-controlled anti-
aircraft-artillery (AAA). The U.S. didn’t use chaff against these systems or jam the 
fighter communications frequencies because they wanted to keep their EW capabilities as 
a secret for potential use against the Soviet Union. U.S. forces were allowed to use only 
spot jamming for the AAA fire-control radars. After the U.S. lost a large number of 
aircraft, they started deploying chaff and channel jamming [11]. After this, the U.S. 
understood the importance of EW-trained crew members, who began to be considered as 
part of operational requirements. 
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In the early 1950s, Russia built the first surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, the 
SA-1 Guild. The SA-2 Guideline quickly followed. Airborne EW systems were used to 
reduce the effectiveness of SAMs. More modern and capable aircraft were being used for 
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) missions. The largest U.S. ELINT aircraft of the period 
was the Convair RB-36, pictured below, which was equipped with a comprehensive EW 
suite.  
 
Figure 8.   RB-36D (From [13]) 
 
The RB-36D was a reconnaissance version of the B-36D. The No. 1 
(forward) bomb bay was fitted with 14 cameras. The No. 2 bay was used 
to carry up to 80 100-pound photo flash bombs for nighttime aerial 
photography. The third bay could be equipped with a variety of additional 
equipment, including a 3,000-gallon fuel cell for increasing the endurance 
of the aircraft. The last bay was equipped with electronic counter measures 
gear. Externally, the RB-36D was similar to the B-36D bomber version; 
however, the reconnaissance version had many more antennas and four 
large radomes. [13] 
By the early 1950s, the U.S. started to use the U-2 aircraft for collecting 
intelligence and analyzing the Soviet threats. The Lockheed Skunkworks CL-282 aircraft 
was approved for production by the CIA, under the code-name AQUATONE, with 
Richard M. Bissell as the CIA program manager. President Dwight D. Eisenhower 




Figure 9.   U-2 "Dragon Lady" (From[15]) 
 
The Lockheed U-2, Dragon Lady, is a single-engine, high-altitude aircraft flown 
by the United States Air Force. It provides day and night, high-altitude (70,000 ft/21,000 
m plus), all-weather surveillance. The aircraft is also used for electronic sensor research 
and development, satellite calibration, and satellite data validation. The U-2 made its first 
flight in August 1955, with famed Lockheed test pilot Tony LeVier at the controls, and 
began operational service in 1956.  
By late 1957, Adana AB (renamed Incirlik AB on 28 February 1958) had 
become the main U-2 operating location, having absorbed the resources of 
a unit in Germany. One of the tasks the unit performed involved flying 
over missile sites in the Soviet Union from forward operating locations at 
Lahore and Peshawar in Pakistan. For every mission that penetrated Soviet 
airspace, there was at least one surveillance flight along the border to 
divert Soviet air defense attention from the intruder. These diversionary 
flights typically departed Adana AB traveling over Van (in eastern 
Turkey), Iran, and the southern Caspian Sea to the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border; they returned along a similar route. These periphery missions 
usually collected communications and electronic signals instead of 
photographic imagery. The U-2 operation continued at the base for several 
years in the utmost secrecy, until 1 May 1960. A U-2, piloted by Gary 
Powers, was on a photo run at 67,000 feet when the Soviets launched an 
SA-2. Although the SA-2s could not achieve the same altitude as the U-2, 




missiles. Soviet authorities subsequently arrested Powers after he 
successfully ejected from the plane, and held him on espionage charges for 
nearly 2 years. [14] 
U-2s not only photographed military and industrial installations but also collected 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) on operating radars. The intelligence collected by U-2s was 
very valuable because it could help determine characteristics of the enemy emitters and 
even defense system structure. U-2s collected the following intelligence [16]: 
• • The frequency of the enemy emitter 
• • The rate at which a radar beam can be made to scan through an aircraft.  
• • The rate at which the radar pulses are transmitted.  
• • Time width of the radar pulses  
• • Signals  
In October 1952, the Strategic Air Command issued requirements for an air-
launched decoy that could be carried by its Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers (then 
under development) and released just prior to penetrating enemy airspace. This would be 
used to confuse an enemy's defensive radar network, providing radars with a false target 
that had the identical radar image of the B-52 and would fly at approximately the same 
speed and altitude. Enemy defensive resources would be diverted from at least some of 






Figure 10.   ADM-20 “QUAIL” MISSILE (From[18]) 
 
In 1955, the USAF started a major development effort for these decoy missiles. 
The projects included the GAM-71 Buck Duck (a rocket-powered air-launched vehicle to 
be carried by the B-36 Peacemaker), the SM-73 Bull Goose (a ground-launched long-
range jet-powered decoy), and the GAM-72 Green Quail, a turbojet-powered air-
launched decoy for internal carriage by B-52s. In February 1956, McDonnell was the 
prime contractor for the GAM-72, whose name was shortened to Quail. In July 1957, 
they started the tests, and in November 1957 they flew the first free glide flight of an 
XGAM-72 prototype. In August 1958, the first successful powered flight occurred. By 
September 1960, the USAF received its first production Quails, and in February 1961, the 
first B-52 squadron with Quail decoys was operational [19]. 
The development of EW was stimulated by the military competition 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and served a role in maintaining a 
critical balance of mutual deterrence. [11] 
In the late 1950s, space became the newest playground for the EW world. On 
October 4, 1957, the Russians jump-started the "Space Race" by launching Sputnik, the 
first space satellite. The U.S. Moonbounce program collected radiation from Soviet 
The Quail was a bomber-launched 
decoy missile of the USAF, designed 
to appear on the enemy's radar 
screens as additional bombers, and 




radars after it was reflected from the surface of the moon and back to the Earth. A 
number of these observations were able to provide useful intelligence to the U.S. [20].   
 
Figure 11.   Studies from “Operation Moonbounce” (EME path losses) (From[20]) 
 
2. Vietnam War Era (1962–1975) 
The Vietnam War was a period when many of the advances and innovations in 
tactics and technology took place. After the South Vietnamese military and political 
situation deteriorated, U.S. support and involvement in operations increased. All air 
operations came under U.S. control. Meanwhile, the U.S. was trying to keep the Soviet 
Union and China out of the conflict and at the same time to reduce any adverse public 
opinion.   
SA-2s were the first SAMs sighted in Vietnam. This system had proven itself 
(after the May 1960 shootdown of Gary Powers and similar downing of Major Rudolph 
Anderson’s U-2 over Cuba in 1962) very effective against high flying threats. The V-75 
(SA-2) surface-to-air missile system was designed for the defense of both fixed targets 
and field forces. The V-75 was designed to cope with the threat posed by small groups of 
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aircraft rather than massed raids. Flexibility and mobility are its chief advantages. It is 
intended for defeat of manned and pilotless air attack weapons at altitudes ranging from 
300 feet to 60,000 feet, at speeds of up to 3000 km/h and ranges up to 27 nm [21]. 
 
Figure 12.   SA-2 (V-750VK Dvina) (From[22]) 
Range: Minimum 5 miles; maximum effective range about 19 miles; maximum slant range 27miles 
Ceiling: Up to 60,000 ft.    Warhead: 288-lb. blast-fragmentation    Speed: Mach 3.5  
 
Due to the introduction of SA-2s into Vietnam, the U.S. changed tactics. Aircraft 
were forced to fly at lower altitudes where AAA was more effective. The Americans lost 
many aircraft due to AAA and ground fire. In addition to the SA-2s, the North 
Vietnamese had 200 early-warning and ground-controlled interception (GCI) radars, and 
around 2,000 AAA in their inventory [11].  The solution against the SAM threat was 
partly solved by anti-SAM aircraft missions. These aircraft, whose sole mission would be 
to kill the SAM sites, were equipped with radar homing and warning (RHAW) sets. The 
name of this project was “Project Weasel or Wild Weasel 1” [23]. 
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The first RHAW sets, designated the AN/APR 25, were put into F-100F Super 
Sabre aircraft. This new equipment would allow the aircrew to get a bearing on a SAM 
when it turned on its radar. The equipment suite also had a launch warning detector 
function, which would alert the aircrew when a SAM was launched.  
 
Figure 13.   AN/APR-25(V) Strobe Display Scope (From[24]) 
 
There were new fighter aircrew personnel for the new "Weasel" aircraft. They 
were called Electronic Warfare Officers (EWOs), and were also known as "Bears," or 
"GIB" (Guy In the Back). The EWO was responsible for monitoring the new radar 
location sets and locating the SAM sites—basically acting as the eyes and ears of the 
aircraft for the pilot. The EWOs were chosen from among B-52 crews and the training 
began in October 1965 at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. In early November 1965, they 
deployed to Korat Air Base in Thailand to begin their Wild Weasel missions. 
 
Figure 14.   F-100F (First Wild Weasel Aircraft) (From[25]) 
AN/APR-25(V) strobe display scope 
(Applied Technology Inc., Palo Alto, California). 
Part of the RHAW system. Gun tracking radar 




Wild Weasel 1 began with five F-100F aircraft and five aircrews. The Weasel 
crews began their missions in December 1965. The equipment and tactics were new to 
the pilots and EWOs. They flew in hunter/killer teams, the Weasel aircraft flying in 
formation with F-105D fighter/bombers. The Weasels would mark the SAM site, and the 
F-105D's would finish it off. They attacked with rockets, napalm, cannon and, beginning 
in March 1966, with Texas instruments AGM-45 Shrike Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARM). 
The Shrike missile was a short range, passive missile, which locked on to the signals 
emanating from the SAM's radar to guide it to its target.  
 
Figure 15.   AGM-45 (From[26]) 
 
On December 22, 1965, the Wild Weasels killed the first SAM in North Vietnam. 
After this success, the importance of the Weasels became evident, and from then on the 
Wild Weasels were in Vietnam to stay. However, despite this early success the Weasels 
suffered a fifty-percent casualty rate and it was clear that they needed to develop new 
tactics and equipment. 
It became clear during the Weasel missions that the Super Sabre was not fast 
enough or ideally suited to the mission. The F-100F could not keep up with F-105D 
fighter-bombers. Therefore, the Air Force decided to use an F-105 Thunderchief variant 
for Wild Weasel missions. In July 1966, the F-100Fs flew their last missions. They were 
then replaced by the F-105 Thunderchief, which served as the primary Wild Weasel 




Figure 16.   F-105 Thunderchief “THUD” (From[27]) 
 
The F-105 conducted over 75% of the USAF bombing strikes during the war. The 
Thunderchief was faster, more agile, carried more ordnance, and was considerably more 
durable than the F-100F. In May 1966, the new F-105F Weasels were deployed to 
Vietnam. It was obvious that the F-105F was a much better aircraft for these missions.  
In the beginning of 1967, the U.S. introduced a new version of the Thunderchief, 
the F-105G Wild Weasel. This upgraded aircraft was equipped with advanced avionics 
and greater weapons capabilities. The AN/APR-25 RHAW was replaced by an upgraded 
version, and the AGM-45 Shrike missile was augmented with the AGM-78. The AGM-
78 Standard anti-radiation missile had an improved seeker head and a better range; this 
gave Weasel pilots much improved standoff capability. It was good news for Wild 





Figure 17.   AGM-78 (From [28]) 
 
Nearing the end of the war, the U.S. conducted a series of bombing missions from 
18 December to 29 December 1972. This was called Linebacker II, which was a joint 
U.S. Seventh Air Force and U.S. Navy Task Force 77 aerial bombardment campaign. The 
internal EW suites provided self protection when bombing from high altitude. During the 
bombardment, F-105G Wild Weasels and General Dynamics F-111s attacked the North 
Vietnamese SAM sites and airfields while EB-66s provided stand-off jamming. 
Linebacker II was proof that “a powerful barrage of electronic jamming, combined with 
vast quantities of chaff and carefully evolved anti-missile tactics backed by Wild Weasel 
attacks on the launching sites could reduce the effectiveness of the air defense system 




Figure 18.   “Rolling Thunder” and “Linebacker” (From[31]) 
This graphic shows the protection for Rolling Thunder and Linebacker-era strikes. Note 
the increase in support forces to defend fewer bombers 
 
The loss rate was significantly reduced by the coordination of effective tactics 
with electronic warfare techniques. “Along with the development of the Wild Weasels, 
the U.S. also introduced the first tactical jamming pods to be fitted on fighter-bomber 
aircraft. These new technologies, such as the Quick Reaction Capability (QRC)-160 pods, 
and later the AN/ALQ-87 family of communication and radar jamming pods, provided 
protection to tactical aircraft beginning in 1965.” [29] QRC-160 pods would fill the 
enemy radar scopes with strobe lines, making it very difficult to lock the targets. 
However, the pods had some restrictions. The pods broadcast jamming into a cone 
beneath the aircraft so that hard maneuvers would point the cone away from SAMs and 
make the plane a clear, hard target in the sky.  
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Placing all the bombers into a special 'jamming cell' formation made the jamming 
even more effective, but in this case the formation would be more vulnerable to MIG 
attacks [30]. 
 
Figure 19.   Line-abreast jamming cell formation (From [31]) 
This illustration shows a typical line-abreast jamming cell formation used by the 388th 
Tactical Fighter Wing in Operation Rolling Thunder. SAMs would tend to aim for the 
space between the four flights of aircraft and explode harmlessly 
 
Chaff remained one of the most important protection devices for the USAF, and 
was widely used in the Vietnam War. For example, eight aircraft could lay a 'chaff 
corridor' 5 miles wide by 30 or 100 miles long, like a carpet. Aircraft flying in or just 
above this carpet of chaff were masked from radar beams for a fifteen-minute window. 
With standoff jammers, jamming pods, beacon jamming and chaff combined, raids were 
largely safe from the ground defenses. 
Chaff was so effective that the Vietnamese MiGs started to attack the chaff-laying 
flights and escort protection for them became a priority. The chaffers adopted several 




Figure 20.   Different methods of chaff delivery (From [31]) 
 
There are many more lessons learned from the Vietnam War with regard to EW:  
• Effective EW capability is crucial for air operations and aircraft 
survivability in a well-integrated and effective enemy air defense 
environment. Wild Weasel aircraft, RHAW systems and jamming pods 
provided the proof of this assertion. Combining airborne surveillance and 
control, air defense, attack, EW, and reconnaissance aircraft in tightly 
coordinated strike packages was essential to attacks on heavily defended 
targets in Vietnam. 
• It was a clear message to the world that proliferation of airborne EW 
systems, realistic EW training, and an escalating air defense threat was 
gaining importance in battles [29]. 
3. Yom Kippur (1973) and the Bekaa Valley (1982) 
Six years after the 1967 Six Day War, in October 1973, Syria and Egypt 
combined to attack Israel to recapture the territory they lost. High altitude SA-2 and SA-3 
systems were known by the Israelis, but SA-6 systems, which were deployed by the 
Soviets to the region, were fairly new to the Israeli pilots. The SA-6 GAINFUL was a 
two stage, solid-fuel, low-altitude SAM. It used radio command guidance with semi-
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active radar terminal homing. It was more accurate and more jam resistant than the older 
SAM systems. This system was extremely flexible [32]. Since the SA-6 was used in this 
conflict for the first time in combat, no one knew anything about this new threat and there 
had not been enough opportunity to properly prepare electronic warfare systems to 
counter it. 
 
Figure 21.   SA-6 GAINFUL (From [34]) 
 
The ZSU 23-4 anti-aircraft gun system was used to complement SA-6 systems 
against aircraft attacks from low altitude. The SA-7 GRAIL (Strela-2), an IR-guided 
MANPAD, was also used to fill the gaps in the defense system [33]. The SA-7 man-
portable, shoulder-fired, low-altitude SAM system was similar to the U.S. Army 
REDEYE, with a high explosive warhead and passive infrared homing guidance. It was 
effective against helicopters and slower aircraft. Because of these new defense systems, 
the Israelis initially suffered heavy losses—more than 80 aircraft in the first week of the 
war, and more were damaged [16]. This is evidence of the importance of secrecy 
regarding equipment that can surprise an enemy. An adversary is then left defenseless 
against your new weapon, without the opportunity to develop counter measures against 




Figure 22.   ZSU-23-4 Shilka 23mm Antiaircraft Gun (From[36]) 
 
 
Figure 23.   SA-7 GRAIL (From [37]) 
 
The SA-7a (9K32 Strela-2) was introduced for service in 1968, but was soon replaced by the SA-7b (9K32M 
Strela-2M), which became the most common production model. The SA-7b differs from the SA-7a primarily 
by using a boosted propellant charge to increase range and speed. The SA-7a had a slant range of 3.6 km and a 
kill zone between 15 and 1500 meters in altitude, with a speed of about 430 meters per second (Mach 1.4). 
The SA-7b has a slant range of about 4.2 km, a ceiling of about 2300 meters, and a speed of about 500 meters 
per second (Mach 1.75). Both the SA-7a and SA-7b are tail-chase missile systems, and its effectiveness 
depends on its ability to lock onto the heat source of low-flying fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft targets   
[33]. 
The Shilka ZSU-23-4 [ZSU = Zenitnaya Samokhodnaya Ustanovka - Anti-aircraft Self-
Propelled Gun] is a Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun (SPAAG) featuring a prominent radar 
dish that can be folded down mounted on a modified PT-76 chassis. The ZSU 23-4 Shilka 
is capable of acquiring, tracking and engaging low-flying aircraft (as well as mobile ground 
targets) while either in place or on the move. Employed in pairs 200 meters apart, 400 
meters behind battalion leading elements, it is commonly used to suppress ATGM launch 
sites, such as TOW vehicles. The armament consists of four 23mm cannon with a 
maximum slant range of 3,000 meters [35]. 
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After this painful experience, Israel invested heavily in C3I and EW systems; 
airborne, rocket and artillery propelled defense suppression weapons; intelligence 
gathering; planning; and training. 
In 1982, these investments paid off during the conflict with Syria. “The Bekaa 
Valley (Lebanon) air battle of June 1982 is widely regarded as a significant development 
in modern warfare. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) achieved a remarkable military victory, 
and certainly there are lessons to be learned from it.” [38]. 
Palestinian terrorists made an assassination attempt against the Israeli ambassador 
in London on 3 June 1982. The next day, Israel attacked Palestine Liberation 
Organization bases in Lebanon with aircraft, and on 6 June ground forces started 
marching toward Beirut. The Syrians tried to use their air force for defense against Israeli 
ground and air attacks. 
One of the biggest Syrian mistakes was that they hadn’t changed the location of 
their mobile SAM (SA-6 Gainful) systems for almost one year. Israel was prepared, and 
executed a well-planned and pre-rehearsed attack against the Bekaa Valley integrated air 
defense system (IADS). Because of this error, Israel had all the information about the 
Syrian IADS: exact location of the SAM, radar, communications infrastructure and also 
their electronic fingerprints. Israel possessed thorough electronic and location 
intelligence. In the first attack against the Bekaa on 9 June 1982, the IAF destroyed 17 of 
the 19 Syrian SAM batteries and their radar sites, as well as 29 Syrian Air Force (SAF) 
fighter aircraft. The day after, the IAF destroyed the remaining missile batteries. By the 
end of July, Syria had lost at least 87 aircraft, while Israeli lost just a few helicopters, one 
RF-4E, and an A-4 Skyhawk [38].    
IAF tactics included flying remote piloted vehicles (RPV) in simulated attack 
profiles and radar signatures, deceiving the Syrian IADS. While the Syrians were 
reloading their weapons, Israeli long-range artillery and rocket systems attacked SAM 
sites, and soon thereafter, aircraft attacked the early warning and fire control radars with 
AGM-45 Shrikes, AGM-78 Standard-ARMs, and AGM-65 Mavericks. During these 
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attacks, the IAF successfully employed jamming and chaff against the Syrian radar 
operators and air-to-ground and air-to-air communications [11]. 
Obviously, the IAF possessed air superiority and a qualitative advantage over the 
SAF. During the Lebanon War, Syrian pilots flew MiG-21s, MiG-23s and Su-20s. The 
Israelis, on the other hand, had the best fighters then available: McDonnell Douglas F-15s 
and General Dynamics F-16s, along with older, upgraded, and still effective McDonnell 
Douglas F-4s and Israeli Aircraft Industries Kfirs. The IAF armed their aircraft with U.S.-
made AIM-7F Sparrow radar-guided missiles and AIM-9L Sidewinder infrared-guided 
missiles. The Syrians had no comparable ordnance, relying instead on the 1960s vintage 
AA-2 "Atoll." 
Furthermore, the Israelis had progressed in command, control, and 
communications (C3). The Bekaa Valley battle was the first war in which modern 
airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft were used, specifically the U.S.-
made Grumman E-2C Hawkeye. As an airborne radar platform, the Hawkeye had the 
capability to monitor over 200 aircraft simultaneously and control up to 130 separate air-
to-air engagements at ranges up to 250 miles. In addition, the E-2C carried an ALR-59 
passive detection system that could pick up radar signals from 500 miles. F-15s, with a 
superior planar array radar system, were also used as a "mini-AWACS" to help manage 
air-to-air engagements [38]. 
The IAF jammed Syrian C3 using modified Boeing 707s. These aircraft were 
equipped with standoff jammers capable of disrupting several enemy frequencies at once 
with very little out-of-phase disturbance, thereby minimizing self-jamming of frequencies 
used by the IDF. With the effective jamming of Syrian communications and radar 
systems, SAF aircraft found themselves in a chaotic situation.  
The Israelis demonstrated a good capability of preservation of their own C3 
against electronic countermeasures (ECM). For the protection of communications from 
Syrian interference, the IDF developed a very high frequency (VHF) FM radio system 
that changed radio frequencies across a 30 to 88 megahertz (MHz) band.  
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As mentioned earlier, RPVs also played an important role, especially in the initial 
phase of the war. This innovation made a strong contribution toward the Israeli victory. 
These drone aircraft served as cheap and survivable intelligence platforms. They also 
used “real-time" video intelligence systems. “Once the tactical reconnaissance and 
deception functions were completed and strike aircraft were directed to the SAM sites, 
air-launched laser-guided ordnance was guided to the target by laser designators mounted 
on the RPVs.” [39] 
The Bekaa Valley battle clearly demonstrates the importance of electronic warfare 
and C3. The general concept for today’s battles is to control the air first. In order to win 
the air battle, one must first conquer the electromagnetic spectrum. This electronic 
warfare requirement was aptly demonstrated during the Bekaa Valley campaign [38]. 
a. Aircraft and Missiles Used in Bekaa Valley Battle 
 





Figure 25.   F-16 “FALCON” 
 
Figure 26.   AIM-7 “SPARROW” 
 
Figure 27.   SU-20 "FITTER" 
 




Figure 29.   F-4 “PHANTOM” 
 
Figure 30.   MIG-21 "FISHBED" 
 
Figure 31.   AIM-9L “SIDEWINDER” 
 




4. The First Gulf War (Operation DESERT STORM) 
The Persian Gulf War or Gulf War  (2 August 1990–28 February 1991) [40] was 
a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force from 34 nations authorized by the United 
Nations (UN). Members of the Coalition included Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, 
Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, 
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and 
the United States of America. Germany and Japan provided financial assistance. India 
extended military support to the United States in the form of refueling facilities situated 
in the Arabian Sea [40] [41].  
The main aim was to return Kuwait to the control of the Emir of Kuwait after the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops. The expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait started in 
January 1991 and victory for the coalition forces came in 7 weeks.  
The Gulf War has demonstrated yet again the central importance of 
electronic warfare to the conduct of a modern air war. So overwhelming 
was the weight of the initial attack, that the Iraqi IADS (integrated air 
defence system) collapsed in hours, never to regain anything approaching 
a semblance of functionality. The destruction of Iraq's IADS is a very 
good study of contemporary Western doctrine in the area of electronic 
combat, and deserves thus a close examination. [42] 
First of all, it is a good idea to walk through the Iraqi air defense system. The 
Iraqis had  17,000 SAMs, 10,000 AAA and a wide variety of communications links [43]. 
During DESERT STORM “Organisationally the IADS was split into three principal 
elements, a national fixed site strategic system using fighters and SA-2 and SA-3 systems 
covering key airfields and strategic air defence sites, operated by the Iraqi air force. This 







covering key nuclear, biological and chemical warfare facilities. Finally, the Iraqi army 
had its own mobile radar, SAM and AAA systems tasked with protecting both fixed sites 
and units in the field.” [42] 
The SA-2 is an older system that was used during the Vietnam War. It was known 
to be susceptible to countermeasures and needed to be supported with some newer 
systems.  ECCM measures were added as a priority. The fire control radar of the SA-2 
was upgraded. The Fan Song E used a LORO (Lobe On Receive Only) technique, with 
auxiliary transmit antennas, and the Fan Song F used auxiliary optical angle tracking. The 
SA-2s used P-12 and P-12M Spoon Rest low PRF MTI acquisition radars.  
For air defense aircraft, the Iraqis used the MiG-23, MiG-25, and the MiG-29. In 
total, Iraqi forces had 550 aircraft including Soviet Tu-16 and Tu-22 medium bombers, 
the more modern Su-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft, a core of MiG-21 fighters, and a few 
long-range Su-24 fighter bombers [43]. 
The SA-3 Goa was designed for low flying targets. There are different reports on 
how many Goa systems Iraq had, but it can be accepted at 25 battalions. To support the 
SA-3 Goa, the P-15 Flat Face, which is a low PRF MTI acquisition radar, was used. It 
has good ECCM performance. The Goa missile is more agile than the SA-2, and the SA-
3 tracking radar has better ECCM and low altitude tracking performance [43]. 
Another way to analyze the Iraqi SAM defenses is to split them into two major 
groups: area defense SAM Systems and point defense SAM Systems [43]. Looking first 
at the area defense SAMs, even though they mainly originated from the Soviet Union, 
there were also some European weapons in use. Area defense coverage was provided 
mostly by the SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6. There were approximately 70 batteries. The Iraqi 
army's mobile SA-6/Gainful 9M9 ZRK Kub/Kvadrat was the most potent area defense 
SAM system. It was supported by the Straight Flush radar system. It had modified 
monopulse seekers for improved ECCM. 
The most potent of the Iraqi point defense SAM systems were the SA-8 Gecko 
and the Franco-German Euromissile Roland. Both the Roland and the Gecko are accepted 
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as serious threats to low flying aircraft as they can be easily hidden and can operate 
autonomously. Both of these systems are very resistant against ECM.  
IR SAMs supplemented the radar-guided SAMs in the point defense role. The 
Iraqi Army used 9M31 Strela 1 or SA-9 Gaskin as the most common IR system. The 
Gaskin is very similar to early models of the Sidewinder. It is usually operated in 
conjunction with the ZSU-23-4P anti-aircraft gun system. The Iraqis had also recently 
acquired the newer 9M37 Strela 10 or SA-13 Gopher IR SAM.  
The static area defense SAMs were supplemented by AAA, The AAA was further 
supplemented by machine guns, hand held automatic weapons and man portable SAMs 
such as the SA-7B and SA-14, and the Chinese built HN-5A, a modified SA-7B with a 
cooled seeker. 
The operational concept of the Iraqi air defense was to provide overlapping zones 
of coverage by various weapon types. This concept of operations is common to many 
nations’ defensive systems. This forces adversaries to use more complex and larger ECM 
systems. In DESERT STORM, EW and ECM played an important role in penetrating 
these overlapping defensive lines.  
The EW power of the Coalition Forces shouldn’t be underestimated. Below is a 
table listing the assets of the Coalition Forces which were used during the war. [29] 
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Table 2.   Assets of the Coalition Forces 
PLATFORM MISSION
USAF RC-135 Extensive SIGINT (ELINT/COMINT)
USAF U-2R Collection of COMINT
RAF Nimrod R.2 ES purposes
French DC-8 Sarigue,
EC-160 Gabriel, SA330 Puma Helicopter
USAF EA-6B, F-4G Wild Weasel, EF-111A Refinement of the electronic order of
Tornado, B-52, Jaguar, F-16, battle (EOB), SEAD,hard-kill missions
F-111, F-117A Nighthawk, A-10
US Magnum and Vortex ELINT IMINT/ELINT purposes
KH-12 imaging satellites
USAF EF-111A Escort air strikes, provide jamming
US Marine and Navy EA-6B support to penetrate targets
USAF EC-130H Compass Call Communications jamming
RAF Tornado GR1 Hard-kill mission with ALARM ARM
US Navy Tomahawk Cruise missile (CM) for hard-kill
Emission Control (EMCON) Reduce the radiated energy that is
vulnerable to hostile ES and EA
US Army SINCGARS, Had integral EP capabilities















The U.S. flew the F-14D and F-15C as interceptors, F-117A stealth fighters, B-52 
strategic bombers, F-4G Wild Weasels armed with HARMs, A-10 Warthog tank killers, 
and Hellfire-capable Apache and Super Cobra helicopters for tactical ground support to 
the battlefield. The F-16, EF-111A, the EA-6B, the F/A-18, and RF-4C were also used. In 
addition, Tomahawk cruise missiles were widely employed during the operation. The 
French flew Jaguars, and the British flew the GR-1 and F-3 Tornados. Furthermore, 
Tomahawk cruise missiles were widely used during the operation. The F-16, EF-111A, 
the EA-6B, the F/A-18, and the RF-4C were also used by U.S. forces [43].  
As the Coalition commenced air operations against the Iraqi forces, command 
posts, communication systems, airfields, air defense radars, operation centers, and the 
electrical generation and distribution networks were the high priority targets [11]. The 
first breach was made against two radar stations near the border southwest of Baghdad by 
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eight AH-64A attack helicopters. In the meantime, two F-117As destroyed the Iraqi air 
defense operations center in Nukheyb with GBU-27s. Right after the F-117 and AH-64A 
attacks, other F-117As and R/UGM-109C/D Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM 
C/Ds) destroyed command and communications targets and elements of the electrical 
power network.  
 
Figure 33.   R/UGM-109C/D Tomahawk Land Attack (From [45]) 
 
During the next wave, BQM-74 drones and Tactical Air Launched Decoys 
(TALDs) were used. The BQM-74 was a thirteen-foot-long unmanned jet-powered drone. 
The Iraqis, after being decoyed and shooting these down, thought that they killed many 
aircraft. Following the decoys, a mass of seventy allied aircraft armed with radar-killing 





Figure 34.   Tomahawk Weapon System Evaluation (From [46]) 
 
 
Figure 35.   BQM-74E (From [47]) 
BQM-74E Technical Specifications  
Length....................................12.95 ft (4.0 m)  
Wingspan...............................5.78 ft (1.8 m)  
Range.....................................> 350 nm (648.6 
km)  
Altitude Low..........................7 ft (2.1 m)  
Altitude High.........................40,000 ft (12.2 
km)  
Speed......................................> 515 Knots at 
Sea Level  
Weight....................................455 lbs (206.4 kg)  
Endurance..............................78 Minutes  
Navigation..............................GPS/IMU  
Fuel........................................Jet Fuel (JP-5, JP-
8 or Jet A-1) 
 





Figure 36.   F-117A (From [47]) 
 
Protected by fighter cover and EW support, the F-4Gs accomplished their 
suppression of enemy air defenses very easily with the help of the decoys. All the radar 
systems and anti-aircraft batteries were focused on the drones, providing the F-4Gs with 
numerous radar targets to strike. 
The loss rate for Coalition air forces was very low. This was because they 
gathered accurate SIGINT on Iraqi air defense systems, conducted successful SEAD 
tactics, utilized effective HARM and ALARM anti-radiation missiles, employed well-
developed EW systems in their aircraft, and possessed very well-trained crews [29]. 
 
Figure 37.   AGM-88 HARM MISSILE (From [49]) 
 
The Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk is a 
stealth ground attack aircraft operated 
solely by the United States Air Force. 
The F-117A's first flight was in 1981, 
and it achieved Initial Operational 
Capability status in October 1983. The 
F-117A came out of secrecy and was 
revealed to the world in November 1988.
As a product of the Skunk Works and a 
development of the Have Blue 
prototype, it became the first operational 
aircraft initially designed around stealth 
technology. The F-117A was widely 






Figure 38.   ALARM (Air Launched Anti-Radiation Missile) (From [50]) 
ALARM (Air Launched Anti-Radiation Missile) is a British anti-radiation missile 
designed primarily to destroy enemy radars for the purpose of Suppression of Enemy Air 
Defense (SEAD). It is used by the RAF and the Royal Saudi Air Force. 
 
Two E-8A JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System) aircraft 
supported the ground war which followed the air campaign. E-8 JSTARS provided 
information on the movement of Iraqi ground forces, regardless of the time of day. The 
E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft was used to support air 
operations. The AWACS acted as the eyes for the air forces, JSTARS did the same for 
the ground forces, and the RC-135s were the ears for everyone. The RC-135 aircraft 
monitored Iraqi communications, and located and localized the source of any hostile 





Figure 39.   E-8A "JSTARS" (From [51]) 
 
 
Figure 40.   E-3 AWACS (From [52]) 
 
The ground war lasted only 100 hours, with fewer than 500 Coalition casualties 
[11]. This was due in large part to the excellent EW carried out by Coalition forces. 
One of the most unique things about this war was the effective use of the Defense 
Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS). Vital communications links were supplied 
via military satellites. The Global Positioning System (GPS) likewise played a very 
important role. GPS provided the necessary land navigation data to some of the coalition 
forces, maintaining a higher level of situational awareness. GPS integrated systems 
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increased accuracy of the weapons. Special Forces made use of GPS in northeastern Iraq 
for targeting and destroying ground forces as well as Scud missiles [44]. 
The side that controls the electromagnetic spectrum has a great advantage on the 
battlefield. All of the studies and results of these previous wars show us the importance of 
the effective use of EW. The winner of future conflicts will likely be the ones who 
control the electromagnetic spectrum. 
D. FROM THE FIRST GULF WAR TO THE PRESENT 
1. Operation Allied Forces (23 March-10 June 1999) 
Kosovo earned autonomous province status under the 1974 Yugoslav 
Constitution. More than 90% of the population was ethnic Albanians. Between 1989 and 
1995, the Yugoslav constitution was changed, revoking this status and abolishing the 
parliament and government of Kosovo. As a result Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, President of the 
‘Coordinative Body of Albanian Political Parties of Kosova’ started a campaign of 
resistance to the Serbian oppression. During 1995 and 1998, this campaign failed and 
negotiations were unsuccessful. As a result, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK) 
was formed with the declared goal of unifying the province with neighboring Albania. 
Between March and June 1998, Kosovo-Albanians asked for full independence and 
separation. The Yugoslavian government answered with several armed attacks and 
claimed to have successfully destroyed the KLA’s core. In August, the UN estimated that 
a total of 235,000 persons had fled their homes since the conflict began. The UN ordered 
an immediate cessation of military activities. On October 13, a truce was established. The 
OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was given access to the whole area of 
Kosovo by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which accepts 
reestablishing substantial local and regional autonomy of Kosovo, but not full 
independence. In December, the truce finally broke down and local fighting resumed in 
Kosovo. In January 1999, NATO blamed the Serb side for the massacre of at least 45 
civilians in the village Racak. In February, NATO started sending soldiers to Kosovo and 
negotiations began. Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic wanted to keep Kosovo as a 
part of Yugoslavia, insisted on UN leadership of foreign forces in Kosovo and rejected 
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quasi-NATO-occupation status for the whole of Yugoslavia.  Richard Holbrooke, the 
U.S. negotiator, did not succeed in making Milosevic accept the plan. The Kosovo-
Albanian delegation signed the peace treaty on 15 March, but the FRY delegates still 
wouldn’t accept the implementation conditions; therefore, NATO forces prepared for 
offensive operations [54]. 
On 24 March at approximately 8 p.m., NATO started the war by launching a 
series of cruise missiles. The attacks against strategic military targets such as radars, 
aircraft, and rockets continued through the night of the following day.  The NATO 
bombardment was aimed at Yugoslav air defense forces. On the fourth day of the war, 27 
March, an American stealth F–117A was shot down near Belgrade. Yugoslav sources 
claimed to have downed a second stealth plane the next day, but the claim was not 
verified by NATO. Phase II attacks started on 29 March and involved strikes on military 
camps, troops, police and military installations. On 1 April, another F–117A crash–
landed in Zagreb. After fourteen days of war, Milosevic on 6 April requested a cease-fire, 
which was rejected by NATO. Twelve days later, NATO claimed to have destroyed the 
Yugoslav Air Force headquarters and 29 MIGs, which was the half of the Yugoslavian 
air force’s fighters [54]. 
 
Figure 41.   Wreckage of downed F-117 (From[53]) 
 
On 3 June, Yugoslavia accepted the peace plan proposed by the G-8 Countries. 
The war had lasted about two-and-a-half months. The Yugoslav army’s system of control 
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and communication was severely damaged in the campaign. Nonetheless, Yugoslav air 
defense did have some successes. In addition to the F-117s noted above, an American 
Apache-helicopter crashed on 27 April. On 2 May, an American F-16CG aircraft was 
shot down over western Serbia [54]. Two days later, another F–117 and an A-10 
Thunderbolt II were hit by ground fire and heavily damaged, but managed to return 
safely.  
Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO operation in Kosovo, is an important 
event in the debate over current and future U.S. EW needs. SAMs were the biggest threat 
to NATO aircraft even though allied forces had suppressed the enemy air defenses. After 
the retirement of the EF111A and the F-4G, the Air Force’s EW capacity was diminished. 
The Air Force trusted the Navy’s EA-6B to fill the EW gap [53].  
During this operation, approximately 30 EA-6Bs performed EA; this is obviously 
a small number of aircraft for the mission with which they were tasked. They were used 
to protect hundreds of allied aircraft flying 37,225 combat sorties over 78 days. 
 
In 
theory, each Prowler would have to fly at least four sorties a day for 78 straight days [56].
 
These aircraft dealt with the Yugoslav (essentially, Serbian) air defense systems, which 
included SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-9, and SA-13 batteries [55], plus numerous shoulder-
fired SA-7 and SA-14 missiles. Because of the Serbian tactics, Allied forces had a hard 
time detecting and engaging enemy SAMs. “Serbian operators limited their radar 
emissions and dispersed their radar sites to avoid destruction. SAM operators took cueing 
data from several different radar sources and fused this information to gather accurate 
tracking data. Minimizing the time for this process allowed the SAM to be fired and radar 
shutdown before NATO aircraft could accurately engage the site.” [53] 
On the fourth night of the war, 28 March, an F-117 flying around Belgrade was 
shot down by enemy SAMs, most probably by the old SA-3 system.
 
This SAM battery 
had not been located. Many factors contributed to the downing of the F-117 but the most 
important one was “the lack of effective EA integration with stealth operations.” EA-6Bs 
were in the same package with the F-117s for EW support, but were orbiting too far away 
to provide adequate jamming; this caused a shortfall in effective EA support tactics.  
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More importantly, in Kosovo the issue regarding stealth reliance versus electronic attack 
was answered. Stealth platforms do, in fact, require support jamming to maximize their 
effectiveness in non-permissive, heavily defended airspace.  
The shortfall in EW assets was severely felt during Operation Allied Force. 
Immediately after the campaign, the U.S. Air Combat command requested a three-fold 
increase (from 30 to 100) in the number of F-16CJ aircraft to be acquired [57].  F-16CJ 
will be provided by modifying the latest model F-16C/Ds (block 40) and the F-16CJs 
(block 50) to be used for both attack and suppression missions.  
2. The War in Afghanistan (7 October 2001-Present) 
The War in Afghanistan was the first major conflict of the 21st Century. 
Though the origins of the war involve the Afghan Civil War and the 
Soviet Invasion and Occupation of the 1970s and 1980s, the current war 
began in October, 2001 in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States. [58] 
a. Causes of Conflict [59] 
After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the Afghan 
Communist government fell in 1992. A civil war broke out between the various factions 
of anti-Communist Afghan fighters. During this time of chaos, some former Mujahedeen 
found a leader in Mullah Mohammed Omar. This member of the Pashtun ethnic group 
led a new armed group called the Taliban. Other former Mujahedeen leaders of Pashtun 
background joined with the Taliban. They also attracted the support of Osama bin Laden 
and his al-Qaida organization. Bin Laden provided both financial and political support to 
the Taliban. 
In late 1994, the Taliban took control of Kandahar and obtained a large 
supply of modern weapons, including fighter aircraft, tanks and helicopters. The Taliban 
used these weapons to defeat several militias and warlords, advancing on Kabul in 
January 1995 and finally capturing the capital in September 1996. Several anti-Taliban 
leaders and their forces fled to the northern part of the country to continue the fight.  
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By 1997, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized 
the Taliban government. Pakistan played an important role in the Taliban success. It is 
generally believed that several Taliban military victories are directly attributable to armed 
Pakistani intervention.  
In 1998, the Al-Qaida group was charged with the bombing of the U.S. 
Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. After that, the United States launched a cruise 
missile attack on training camps belonging to bin Laden's organization in southeastern 
Afghanistan. 
Al-Qaida took full credit for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
The U.S. began plans to take the fight to al-Qaida and its Taliban sponsors, thus 
beginning the so-called “Global War on Terror.” 
Following the Taliban's repeated refusal to expel bin Laden and his group 
and end its support for international terrorism, the U.S. and its partners in 
the anti-terrorist coalition began a military campaign on October 7, 2001, 
targeting terrorist facilities and various Taliban military and political 
assets within Afghanistan. Under pressure from U.S. military and anti-
Taliban forces, the Taliban disintegrated rapidly, and Kabul fell on 
November 13, 2001. [59] 
b. Description of Conflict 
The War in Afghanistan started with air strikes on Taliban and al-Qaida 
targets.  American, British and other Allied special forces troops worked with the 
Northern Alliance (which included the Uzbek forces of General Dostum, the Tajik troops 
of former President Rabbani and the Shiite Hazaris led by Haji Mohammed Mohaqiq). 
This led to coordination between Allied air attacks and ground attacks by the Northern 
Alliance. As a result Kabul fell and the Taliban retreated from most of northern 
Afghanistan. 
As more Allied troops entered the war and the Northern Alliance forces 
fought their way southwards, the Taliban and al-Qaida retreated toward the mountainous 
border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
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An Afghan Interim Authority was formed and took office in Kabul on 
December 22, 2001 with Hamid Karzai as Chairman. The Interim 
Authority held power for approximately 6 months while preparing for a 
nationwide "Loya Jirga" (Grand Council) in mid-June 2002 that decided 
on the structure of a Transitional Authority. The Transitional Authority, 
headed by President Hamid Karzai, renamed the government as the 
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA). One of the TISA's 
primary achievements was the drafting of a constitution that was ratified 
by a Constitutional Loya Jirga on January 4, 2004. On December 7, 2004, 
the country was renamed the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. [59] 
From 2002 onward, the Taliban focused on survival and on rebuilding its 
forces. Beginning in 2005, the Taliban has increased its attacks by using suicide bombers 
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). To counter part of this threat, the EA-6B 
Prowler has been used for the past several years in anti-IED operations, attempting to 
defeat these weapons by jamming remote detonation devices such as garage door openers 
or cellular telephones. This demonstrates that electronic warfare can be used against 
guerilla war. Nonetheless, it is still a new field for EW [61]. 
3. Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-Present) 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), also known as the Iraq War, the Second Persian 
Gulf War or the Occupation of Iraq, is an ongoing military campaign. It is known as 
Operation Telic in the United Kingdom, and Operation Falconer in Australia. OIF began 
with the invasion of Iraq by a multinational force (known as the Coalition) almost 
entirely composed of troops from the United States and United Kingdom. Smaller 
contingents from Australia, Poland, and other nations supported these troops [62]. The 
operation came about in response to continued Iraqi non-compliance with UN 
verification inspections mandated by the UN Security Council at the end of Operation 
Desert Storm [63]. 
On 20 March 2003, at 5:34 a.m. local time in Baghdad, Coalition forces started 
attacks with two F-117s supported by Navy EA-6B Prowlers, as well as 40 ship-fired 




Hours before the attacks on Baghdad, a series of critical targets were destroyed. 
These were: communication sites near Ash Shuaybah, Mudaysis and Ruwayshid; long-
range artillery near Az Zubayr; a mobile early-warning radar and an air defense 
command center at an Iraqi air base in western Iraq; long-range artillery on the Al Faw 
peninsula; a surface-to-surface missile system near Al Basrah; and an air traffic control 
radar near Al Basrah. As is obvious from the target selection, the Coalition struck the 
communications sites and the early-warning radar in order to ruin Iraq’s integrated air-
defense system. The air traffic control radar was used to direct Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery 
fire at Coalition aircraft. Destroying it removed this danger too. [64] 
There were at least three surface-to-surface missiles which were launched from 
Iraqi sites aiming at coalition targets in Kuwait. Iraqi forces fired CSSC-3 Seersucker 
cruise missile which landed in the desert near Camp Commando. There were no 
casualties. They also used Ababil missiles, two of which were fired later in the day 
towards Kuwait City and U.S. targets. They were shot down by Patriot PAC-3s. “The 
military did not disclose how many Patriots were used, but some reports indicate that it 
took at least three Patriots to bring down one of the missiles.” [64] According to the Asia 
times Iraq responded to the attack by firing at least four missiles into northern Kuwait. 
[65] On the other hand CBS news claimed that there were six missiles fired by Iraqis. 
[66] British and American marines captured Umm Qasr, a sea port, some 30 miles south 
of Basra, late on March 20. [64] 
On the second day U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancers, B-2A Spirits, B-52H 
Stratofortresses, F-117 Nighthawks, F-15E Strike Eagles and F-16 Fighting Falcons, plus 
Navy F/A-18 Hornets and F-14 Tomcat, Marine AV-8B Harrier and coalition Tornado 
GR-4, Harrier GR-7 and F/A-18 aircraft flew the strike missions. [67]  
A major air campaign was launched throughout the operations; several hundred 
military targets were struck. Coalition forces conducted more than 3,000 sorties in the air 
attack. “During the 24 hour period that started March 21st at 1 pm ET, the coalition flew 
1,500 total sorties, 700 of which were flown by strike aircraft. The rest were jammers, 
planes protecting bombers, surveillance, etc.” [68] 
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CENTCOM reported that at around 1,000 cruise missiles were launched from 
both naval and air assets in addition over 3,000 precision-guided munitions, were used 
during this war. Also the RAF's new Storm Shadow missile was successfully used for the 
first time on operations. [67]  
On the third day, an MQ-1 Predator found and destroyed a radar-guided AAA. 
The Predator was carrying the AGM-114K "Hellfire II" missile to strike an Iraqi ZSU-
23-4 Mobile AAA. Another Patriot firing battery successfully intercepted and destroyed 
an incoming Iraqi tactical ballistic missile during an attack on U.S. and Coalition Forces 
in Kuwait [68]. On 8 April, one A-10 aircraft was hit by a Roland SAM. 
“During the fourth day a U.S. F-16 fighter engaged a U.S. Patriot battery 
approximately 30 miles south of An-Najaf, Iraq. The F-16 pilot executed the strike 
against the Patriot while en-route to a mission near Baghdad. No soldiers were injured or 
killed by the strike.”[69] [68] 
On the fifth day U.S. forces advanced beyond An Nasiriyah. During this time 
aviation forces attacked Republican Guard formations near Baghdad; one U.S. helicopter 
was lost. Mine clearance operations in the southern waterways made good progress, with 
half the route to Umm Qasr made safe. [70] 
On April 8 One A-10 aircraft which was executing the CAS missions was hit by a 
Roland SAM. The pilot ejected and he was recovered unhurt by Coalition forces. The 
aircraft was hit close to the Saddam International Airport.  [71] 
When the war came to the 21st day, three important cities Kirkuk, Mosul, and 
Tikrit, remained under Iraqi control. Kirkuk and Mosul are strategic cities in northern 
Iraq. Tikrit is the home city of the Hussein family.  
On the 22nd day, Security operations in Baghdad against looting and in Basrah and 
other nearby towns in Southern Iraq started. In northern Iraq, Iraqi forces fled Mosul 
following the cease-fire arranged the day before. 
On the 25th day As U.S. forces pushed towards Tikrit [68]. 
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On the 26th day of combat operations, Tikrit was captured. Four Iraqi tanks were 
destroyed in the skirmishes around Tikrit. [68] 
CENTCOM also announced that there was a possible F/A-18 Hornet strike fighter 
loss on April 2 due to friendly fire by a U.S. Patriot SAM. Also UH-60 helicopter crashed 
in central Iraq. [68] 
“The comparative daily and total air effort as of April 11th was: 
• Total sorties (today/since G-day): About 1,525/About 36,275 
• Strike sorties (today/since G-day): About 375/About 14,050 
• Air and space supremacy sorties (today/since G-day): About 260/About 
• 4,900 
• C2ISR sorties (today/since G-day): About 115/About 2,450 
• Combat search and rescue sorties (today/since G-day): Less than 5/About 
• 270 
• Aerial refueling sorties (today/since G-day): About 380/About 7,525 
• Aerial refueling offloads (through 9 Apr): 310 million pounds (46 million 
• gals) 
• Airlift sorties (today/since G-day): About 400/About 7,100 
• Cargo moved (through 9 Apr): About 55,000 short tons 
• Passengers moved (through 9 Apr): About 76,000 
• Aeromedical evacuation sorties (today/since G-day): About 5/About 110 
• AE urgent patients moved (today/since G-day): Less than 5/About 50 
• AE total patients moved (today/since G-day): About 150/About 1,300 
• Munitions (total guided/total unguided/percent PGM): About 
• 17,000/About 8,500/About 65%”       [68] 
On the 2 May 2003, the President of the U.S. announced from the flight deck of 
the USS Abraham Lincoln that the major combat operations in Iraq had ended [72]. 
Throughout the campaign, Iraqi air defense had proven to be largely ineffective. This was 
due to the severe damage it had suffered in Desert Storm a decade before, and to the early 
Coalition attacks on the remaining command and control assets at the beginning of the 
current operation [73]. 
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IV. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT UAS 
In this chapter, the general features of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are 
discussed. This chapter will pose some questions so as to gain a broad understanding of 
this topic.  
The first question is “What is an unmanned vehicle?” 
Unmanned Vehicle:  A powered vehicle that does not carry a human 
operator, can be operated autonomously or remotely, can be expendable or 
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semi-
ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, artillery projectiles, torpedoes, mines, 
satellites, and unattended sensors (with no form of propulsion) are not 
considered unmanned vehicles. Unmanned vehicles are the primary 
component of unmanned systems. [75] 
The second question would be “What is a UAS?” Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs) have been referred to in many ways: RPV (remotely piloted vehicle), drone, 
robot plane, and pilotless aircraft. An UAV is basically an unpiloted aircraft that can be 
remote controlled or can fly autonomously based on pre-programmed flight plans or more 
complex dynamic automation systems.  
The abbreviation UAV has been expanded in some cases to UAVS 
(unmanned-aircraft vehicle system). The Federal Aviation Administration 
has adopted the generic class unmanned aircraft system (UAS) originally 
introduced by the U.S. Navy to reflect the fact that these are not just 
aircraft, but systems, including ground stations and other elements. [76]  
The third and the most important question would be “Why do we need UAS?” 
There are a number of reasons why UAVs have only recently been given a higher 
priority. We try to increase the use of UAS for three main types of missions: “dull, dirty, 
or dangerous” [75]. 
For example, the longest mission in Operation Enduring Freedom was a B-2 
sortie of over 44 hours, and the longest Operation Iraqi Freedom B-2 sortie was 39 hours. 
Fatigue management is an important factor and may cause death or serious injuries.  This 
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is an example of a mission that could be better performed by a UAS. During “Dull” 
missions, UAS allow the ability to give operators normal mission cycles and crew rest. 
As an example for the “dirty” missions, from 1946 to 1948 the U.S. Air Force and 
Navy used unmanned B-17s and F6Fs, respectively, to fly into nuclear clouds within 
minutes after bomb detonation to collect radioactive samples. During dirty missions, 
UAS increase the probability of a successful mission and minimize human exposure. 
For “dangerous” missions, we can think of any situation that will put human life 
at excessive risk and which may cause political problems. For such missions, UAS lower 
the political and human cost if the aircraft is lost [75]. 
Conventional wisdom holds that UAS offer two main advantages over manned 
aircraft: they are cheaper and more cost-effective than manned aircraft, and they don’t put 
human life at risk. As counterpoint to the first point, however, it should be noted that the 
current UAS accident rate is 100 times more than that for loss or damage to manned 
aircraft [77]. This drives up the total cost, though the entire issue is still subject to debate: 
In its recent UAV study, the Defense Science Board (DSB) notes that 
manned aircraft over the past five decades have moved from the relatively 
high mishap rate to relatively low rates through the advancement of 
system design, weather durability improvements and reliability upgrades 
[70]. It should be pointed out, however, that the UAS, with the exception 
of Predator, have total flight times that are significantly less the than the 
100,000 hours used to calculate the mishap rate. Most aircraft tend to have 
a much higher mishap rate in their first 50,000 hours of flight than their 
second 50,000 hours of flight. Further, some of the UAS in Table 3, have 
flown numerous missions while still under development. Predator and 
Global Hawk, for instance, were rushed into combat well prior to the 
aircrafts’ initial operational capability: 1995 for Predator, and a projected 
FY2006 for Global Hawk. It is unfair, some might argue, to compare the 
mishap rates of developmental UAS with manned aircraft that have 








Table 3.   Select Mishap Rates 
 
 
Another advantage is that unmanned aircraft can be smaller, which would 
increase survivability of the systems over enemy territory. Enemy radar would be less 
likely to detect these systems due to their relatively small radar cross sections (RCS).  
A. UAV CLASSIFICATION 
Classifying UAS is a problematic process. Because UAS are used in many 
different applications, it is not possible to talk about one classification system that covers 
them all. There is no commonly agreed international nomenclature, but it has been 
generally accepted that UAS may be classified by their performance specifications and 
their mission types. Weight, payload, endurance and range, speed, wing loading, cost, 
engine type and power are the performance specifications to conduct a proper 
classification.  The most common mission types are Intelligence, Surveillance, Target 
Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR); combat; multi-purpose; vertical take-off and 
landing: radar and communication relay, and aerial delivery and resupply [78]. 
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1. Classification by Performance Characteristics 
a. Classification by Weight 
Weight of the unmanned systems varies greatly, from micro UAS that 
weigh less than a few pounds to super heavy UAS weighing more than 2000 kg.  
There are five weight classes [78]: 
• Super Heavy Weight UAS: This class includes UAS with take-off 
weights over 2 tons. 
• Heavy Weight UAS: These UAS weigh between 200kg and 2000 
kg.  
• Medium Weight UAS: These are the systems that weigh between 
50kg and 200 kg.  
• Light Weight UAS: This class includes UAS from 5 kg to 50 kg. 
• Micro UAS (MAV): UAS under 5 kg are in this class.  
 
Table 4.   Classification by Weight 
Designation Weight Range Example 
Super Heavy >2000 kg Global Hawk 
Heavy 200-2000 kg Predator 
Medium 50-200 kg Shadow 200 
Light 5-50 kg Aerosonde 




Figure 42.   Weight-All UAS 
 
b. Classification by Endurance and Range 
Another classification method used for UAS is to categorize them by 
endurance and range, which are usually interrelated in manned aircraft systems, but often 
are not in UAS due to line of sight communications restrictions. These parameters are 
very important because they have direct impact on the mission for which a UAS is 
designed. 
There are three classifications [78]: 
• Long Endurance UAS: This class includes UAS that can stay 
airborne for 24 hours or more. The range for these UAS are 
correspondingly high, varying from 1500 km up to 22,000 km. 
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• Medium Endurance UAS: These have endurance between 5 and 
24 hours. This is the most common type of UAS. 
• Low Endurance UAS: UAS with less than five hours endurance 
are considered Low Endurance UAS. Most smaller-sized UAS fall 
into this category. 
 
Table 5.   Range and Endurance 
 
 
Figure 43.   Endurance-All UAS 
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c. Classification by Maximum Altitude 
The maximum operational altitude, or flight ceiling, is another 
performance measure by which UAS can be classified. Higher altitude capability is vital 
for military applications. For avoiding detection and destruction by the enemy, some 
UAS need to fly at high altitudes. For imaging and reconnaissance, a higher altitude is 
required to obtain images of the maximum amount of terrain. 
There are three classes with regard to a UAV’s maximum ceiling [78]: 
• Low altitude UAS: UAS that can fly up to 1000m are considered 
low altitude UAS. These are typically the mini and micro UAS. 
• Medium Altitude UAS: This category includes UAS with 
maximum altitude between 1000m and 10000m. The majority of 
UAVs fall into this category. 
• High Altitude UAS: These unmanned aircraft can fly over 
10000m. 
 
Table 6.   Classification by Maximum altitude 
Category Max Altitude Example 
Low <1000m Raven 
Medium 1000-10000m Predator-A 




Figure 44.   Max Altitude-All UAS 
 
d. Classification by Wing Loading 
Another, but less common, way of classifying UAS is by their wing 
loading. The wing loading of a UAS is calculated by dividing the total weight of the 
UAV by the wing area. 
There are three classes for this classification: 
• High Loading: UAS with a wing loading above 100kg/m2 
constitute this category. 
• Medium Loading: This class includes the UAS with a wing 
loading between 100kg/m2   and 50kg/m2.  
• Low Loading: This class includes the UAS with a wing loading of 




Table 7.   Classification by Wing Loading 
Category Wing loading kg/m2 Example 
Low <50 Seeker 
Medium 50-100 X-45 
High >100 Global Hawk 
 
 
Figure 45.   Wing Loading-All UAS 
 
e. Classification by Engine Type 
There are different types of engines for different types of UAS: turbofans, 
two stroke, piston, rotary, turboprop, push and pull, electric. The lighter, smaller UAS 





Figure 46.   UAS and Engine Types (From[78]) 
 
B. DOD CLASSIFICATION 
According to the DoD definition, UAS can be split into four main groups by size. 
These are:  
• Small. Gross takeoff weight (GTOW) less than 55 pounds 
• Tactical. GTOW between 55 and 1320 pounds 
• Theater. GTOW greater than 1320 pounds 
• Combat. An aircraft designed from inception as a strike platform with 
internal bomb bays or external weapons pylons, a high level of 
survivability, and a GTOW greater than 1320 pounds [75] 
Along with the classifications above, another very commonly used classification 
(currently, the most common nomenclature used in informal discussions) using altitude 
and size is: 
• Micro UAS 
• Mini UAS 
• Tactical UAS 
• Medium Altitude Endurance UAS 




Figure 47.   Altitude and Size Classification 
 
1. Micro UAS 
These UAS have a short range and limited altitude capability, and could be 
carried as a payload of a larger UAS. They could conduct a “perch and stare” mission in 
which they would place themselves in a location without the knowledge of the enemy in 
order to collect imagery, signals, or other types of intelligence. This intelligence could 
then be stored and later collected and sent back to headquarters through a second UAV. 
Naturally, the small size of these systems would limit the power of their transmitter and 
antenna gain, which in turn would limit the distance that they could transmit data [79]. 
2. Mini UAS 
Mini UAVs typically fly between 18 and 45 knots and weigh between 1 and 40 
pounds. They have wingspans between 6 inches and 10 feet. Their maximum ranges are 
limited by line of sight limitations. Mini UAVs must maintain line-of-sight (LOS) 
between the aircraft and the ground station, as they do not typically have the payload 
capacity to carry satellite-over-the-horizon control and communications systems. There is 
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some capability to extend their operational range with the use of modern power-cell 
technology to increase their range/endurance and the use of communications relays (such 
as a string of mini UAVs) to extend RF line of sight. Mini UAVs are easily supportable 
with a small footprint and require very little logistical support [79]. 
3. Tactical UAS 
Tactical UAS are larger systems that require more support, maintenance and 
manpower. On the other hand, they provide greater range and longer loiter capabilities 
than smaller, less capable systems. These systems are typically between 60 to 1000 
pounds and operate at low to medium altitudes. They are typically launched utilizing a 
runway, a catapult, or a rocket assisted launch system [79]. 
4. Medium & High Altitude UAS 
Medium and High Altitude UAS are generally larger than 1,000 pounds. The 
Medium Altitude UAS operate near the altitude of commercial airliners (18,000-45,000 
feet), while High Altitude UAS operate above the commercial airliner airspace, above 
approximately 50,000 feet [79]. 
As it is seen easily from the above, there is no one standard classification for the 
UAS.    
C. U.S. MILITARY UAS CLASSIFICATIONS  
There are also military classification standards designated by each branch: 
1. U.S. Air Force Tiers 
• Tier N/A: Small/Micro UAV. Role filled by BATMAV (Wasp Block III).   
• Tier I: Low altitude, long endurance. Role filled by the Gnat 750. 
• Tier II: Medium altitude, long endurance (MALE). Role currently filled by 
the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper.  
• Tier II+: High altitude, long endurance conventional UAV (or HALE 
UAV). Altitude: 60,000 to 65,000 feet (19,800 m), less than 300 knots 
(560 km/h) airspeed, 3,000-nautical-mile (6,000 km) radius, 24-hour time-
on-station capability. Complementary to the Tier III- aircraft. Role 
currently filled by the RQ-4 Global Hawk.  
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• Tier III-: High altitude, long endurance low-observable UAV. Same 
parameters as, and complementary to, the Tier II+ aircraft. The RQ-3 Dark 
Star was originally intended to fulfill this role before the program was 
cancelled. There is currently no known operational platform filling this 
role [94]. 
 
Table 8.   Comparison of the USAF Tier II, II+ and III- (From [80]) 
Characteristic MAE (Tier II) HAE (Tier II+) LO-HAE (Tier III-) 
Gross Take-off 
Weight 
>1873 lbs 22,914 lbs 8,600 lbs 
Wingspan 48.7 feet 116.2 feet 69 feet 
Mission Duration  
Operating Radius 
24+ hours on station  
@ 500 NM 
24 hours on station  
@3000 NM 
> 8 hours on station  
@ 500 NM 
Maximum 
Endurance 
50+ hours 42+ hours N/A 
Ferry Range N/A 15,000 NM N/A 
Payload 450 lbs 2,000 lbs 1,000 lbs 
True Air Speed 60-110 knots 350 knots >250 knots 
Loiter altitude 25,000 feet max.  
15,000 Feet Nominal 





None Threat warning and 
ECM 
Very low observable 
Command and 
Control 
UHF Milsat/LOS UHF Milsat/LOS  UHF Milsat/LOS 
Sensors SAR: 1 ft IPR, Swath 
Width Approx. 3,300 
ft  
EO: NIIRS 6  
IR: NIIRS 6  
Simultaneous Dual 
Carriage 
SAR: 1 m search; 0.3 m 
spot  
EO: NIIRS 6  
IR: NIIRS 5  
Simultaneous Dual 
Carriage 
SAR: 1 m search 0.3 m 
spot  
EO: NIIRS 6  




13,000 sq NM search 
imagery 
40,000 sq. NM. search 
imagery, or
1,900 spot image frames 
14,000 sq. NM search 
imagery, or
620 spot image frames 
Sensor data 
transmission 
Narrow band Comsat: 
1.5 Mbits  
Ku Band & UHF 
SATCOM  
LOS: C-band 
Wide band Comsat: 20-
50 Mbits/sec  
LOS: X-Band Wide 
Band (CDL): 137-275 
Mbits/sec 
Narrow band Comsat: 1.5 
Mbits/sec  
LOS: X-Band Wide band 
(CDLS): 137-275 
Mbits/sec 
Deployment 2 C-141s or Multiple  
C-130s 
Self deployable, SE 
requires airlift 
2 C-141s or Multiple    C-
130s 
Ground Control LOS & OTH Maximum use of 
GOTS/COTS (LOS & 
OTH) 
Common with Tier II Plus 
79 
 
Data Exploitation Existing and 
Programmed: 




JSIPS, CARS, MIES, 
JIC’s, NPIC 
Existing and Programmed: 
JSIPS, CARS, MIES, 
JIC’s, NPIC 
            
 





Figure 49.   Notional HAE UAV (Tier II+) Mission Profile (From [80]) 
 




As depicted in the pictures above, mission profiles differ depending on the class 
of UAV. Even though all three tiers are designed for conducting similar missions, they 
use different profiles.   
The USAF also names UAS based on mission capability. Prior to this 
decade, this issue was trivial because UAS only performed surveillance 
roles, which is why most UAS on the books have appellations starting 
with 'R' for reconnaissance. Since 2001, however, General Atomics has 
upgraded the Predator to carry Hellfire AGMs, Stinger AAMs, and the 
Viper Strike guided bomb. The USAF gives attack-capable UAVs the 'M' 
designation; consequently, the Predator comes in RQ-1 and MQ-1 
versions.” [81] 
2. U.S. Marine Corps Tiers 
• Tier N/A: Micro UAV. Wasp III fills this role, driven largely by the desire 
for commonality with the USAF BATMAV.  
• Tier I: Role currently filled by the Dragon Eye but all ongoing and future 
procurement for the Dragon Eye program is going now to the RQ-11B 
Raven B.  
• Tier II: Role currently filled by the ScanEagle and, to some extent, the 
RQ-2 Pioneer.  
• Tier III: For two decades, the role of medium range tactical UAV was 
filled by the Pioneer UAV. In July 2007, the Marine Corps announced its 
intention to retire the aging Pioneer fleet and transition to the Shadow 
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Figure 51.   Marine Corps FoS UAV Schedule (From [80]) 
 
 
Figure 52.   Marine Corps Joint UAS Program (From [83]) 
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3. U.S. Army Tiers  
• Tier I: Small UAV. Role filled by the RQ-11A/B Raven.  
• Tier II: Short Range Tactical UAV. Role filled by the RQ-7A/B Shadow 
200.  
• Tier III: Medium Range Tactical UAV. Role currently filled by the RQ-
5A/MQ-5A/B Hunter and IGNAT/IGNAT-ER, but transitioning to the 
Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ERMP) MQ-1C Warrior [84]. 
Obviously, tier definitions differ for every branch. For example, Tier III for the 
U.S. Army is a Medium Range Tactical UAS, but for the Air Force Tier III- is a high 
altitude, long endurance low-observable UAS. 
D. CURRENT AND FUTURE UAS ROLES AND APPLICATIONS: 
1. Current UAS Military Roles 
These are some of the primary missions that UAS can perform, and are 
payload/technology dependant: 
• Airborne surveillance 
• Monitoring chemical, biological and radiation attack/spread 
• Battlefield damage assessment 
• Local area meteorology & mapping 
• Search & rescue 
• Artillery correction 
• Combat: 
• Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) (mobile targets) 
• Support jamming 
• Offensive air-to-air 
• Offensive air-to-ground 
• Third party targeting /designation 
Many UAS are designed and used for intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) missions. There are different types of ISR missions, which may 
either be multi-intelligence, high altitude and long endurance missions conducted by the 
Global Hawk, or “over-the-hill” reconnaissance by the Raven UAS [85]. 
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In 2003, 100 percent of DoD’s major UAS programs were designed for 
conducting  ISR missions. 
Table 9.   UAS Inventory in the U.S. Services (From [85]) 
 
In 2005, 87 percent (12 of 16) major programs were designed for ISR missions. 
By comparing two years, we can see the rapid growth in overall UAS programs.   Most of 
the ISR UAS have almost the same electro-optical and infrared sensors. But they have 
different service levels, communications ranges, flight endurance times and 
landing/takeoff procedures for different types of ISR missions [75]. 




In recent years, UAS started taking active roles in the combat arena. The first 
public acknowledgment was when the CIA used an armed Predator with a Hellfire 
missile against Al-Qaeda in Yemen in 2002. Now, UAS combat capability is increasing. 
For example, most of the Predator A UAS have been equipped with Hellfire missiles; 
Predator B is able to carry more munitions; the Maverick, I-Gnat-ER, Fire Scout and 
Hunter UAS are undergoing armament evaluations. The J-UCAS program is being 
designed just for offensive applications. Using UAS for air-to-ground missions appears 
inherently safer due to lack of risk to human life [77]. 
Today’s technology is not still mature enough for air-to-air missions, but in 
March 2003 a small step forward was made. A Predator armed with a Stinger fired a 
missile against an Iraqi MiG, and the MiG also fired a missile. Naturally, the MiG won 
the battle—for now. This was the first reported air-to-air engagement ever by a UAS. In 
the future, manned aircraft may not fare so well [77]. 
Other military missions that UAS can perform are electronic attack, in which 
there are some new developments, and psychological operations, such as dropping 
leaflets. UAS can also be used for logistic and medical applications. The Army’s Shadow 
has been studied for its capability to deliver critical medical supplies to the battlefield. 
UAS are intended also to be used for homeland defense and homeland security. 
The Coast Guard and U.S. Border Patrol already have plans to deploy UAS. They will 
use the Eagle Eye and Predator to watch coastal waters, patrol the U.S. borders, and 
protect major oil and gas pipelines. Congress supports use of the Predator for border 
security [77]. 
Farther in the future, large UAS will be able to perform the air refueling mission 
that is now performed by manned air refueling tanker aircraft. This mission in some 
respects appears to be well suited for unmanned aircraft. Except for the refueling boom 
operator, the job of the crew is to keep the aircraft flying straight, level, and at a steady 
speed within a constrained airspace. This can be easily accomplished by an unmanned 
system. Automated connection systems could easily replace the boom operator. 
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Additionally, future UAS can be used as communication relays to substitute for 
low-orbiting satellites, reducing the high cost required for space launches [77]. 
The Unmanned Road Map 2007-2032 provides a very detailed categorization for 
current and future applications for UAS. This is pictured in Figure 53. 
 





























Figure 55.   Joint Services Roadmap for Achieving DoD Vision for Unmanned Systems 
(From [75]) 
 
2. UAS Civilian Roles 
When we read through the pages of UAS history, we see that until lately UAS 
were almost always used for military applications. Some of these capabilities could also 
be used in the civilian arena.  Right now there is an existing demand for UAS for real-
time remote sensing, both at the national and the international level. Surveillance and 
reconnaissance are the most demanded mission types in the civil market. But the civilian 
market for UAS lags behind the military. Civilian UAS applications are less than 15% of 
the total UAS market. This is mostly because of the certification and regulatory issues 
[86]. Simply stated, UAS cannot fly in the U.S. outside of very restricted areas.  
There are some key challenges facing the civil UAS community: civil safety and 
environment certification, standards for manufacturing and operating of UAS, radio 
frequency spectrum management, export controls and insurance.  
89 
 
Small, hand-launched, fixed-wing UAS are the best candidates for various civil 
and commercial applications. Moreover they are not overly expensive [87]. 
The following are some of the areas that may benefit most from UAS in the civil 
arena: 
• Fire-fighting 
• Disaster assessment and management 
• Life search and rescue 
• Border surveillance 
• Police surveillance 
• Counter terrorism operations 
• Large scale public outdoor events surveillance 
• Important objects and VIP guard 
• Ground and sea traffic surveillance 
• Environmental control and monitoring (including air and sea pollution) 
• Telecommunications 
• Crop monitoring 
• Animal surveillance 
• Fisheries protection 
• Mineral exploration 
• Ground mapping and photography 
• Meteorological observation 
• Pipeline and power line monitoring 
• Freight carrying [87] 
Security of the homeland, border control & public events, maintenance/security of 
oil and gas pipelines, and communications are all potential missions related to counter-
terrorism. Governments attempt to determine the best methods to secure their nations 
against terrorist attacks. In this case, UAS are the best options for continuous surveillance 
over these areas without overloading human operators.  
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Long-duration law enforcement surveillance came to the attention of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation in October 2002 after the sniper attacks in Washington, 
D.C. They have studied possible security roles for UAS, such as following trucks with 
hazardous cargo and security surveillance of a specific area. The Department of Energy 
has been developing high-altitude instruments that can be carried on a UAS in order to 
measure radiation in the atmosphere. Using UAS for forest fires throughout sparsely 
populated areas is also an option. After the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina, 
another idea is to use large UAS like Global Hawk as a “consequence management” tool. 
South Korea and Japan have used UAS for more than a decade for agricultural purposes 
like crop monitoring and dusting. This is a good example for other countries [77]. 
E. UAS NETWORKING 
UAS control is a critical issue and has a direct effect on the use of UAS. Direct 
line-of-sight (LOS) or satellite link beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) are common techniques 
for UAS control. Network technologies and a special branch of networks known as 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET) have the potential for controlling UAS over 
networks via mobile network nodes. The GCS can be one of these network nodes, 
launching and recovering UAVs. Forward deployed teams can take over the control of 
the UAS for the mission in the target area. Another alternative is for manned aircraft to 
be used for controlling UAS from launch site to target area and flying the mission in the 
target area. “The technology to establish a MANET and control the UAS over the 
network already largely exists, which enables the military to gain BLOS capability with 
LOS technology.” [88] 
F. UAS PLATFORMS  
Recently, there has been a large amount of growth in the number and variety of 
UAS platforms. A conservative estimate gives around 450 individual platform types 
developed by international industrial, research and scientific organisations. “This number 
excludes target drones and also the large numbers in development in the education 
sector.” [89] If we include target drones and those which are still under development, this 
number exceeds 750 [90]. 
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V. HISTORY OF UAS 
A. THE ORIGINS 
The idea of using an unmanned aircraft against enemies has been in the mind of 
humans since long before the Wright brothers invented the airplane. This concept is 
present in ancient history. Winged weapons being used by gods to gain an advantage over 
their enemies were illustrated in Chinese writings, which mention a warlord using large 
kites to carry explosives over the walls of a city and fortress nearly 2,000 years ago. This 
allowed him to attack his enemy while keeping his own troops out of range.  
An aerial balloon that would use a time delay to float over enemies and launch 
rockets down on top of them was designed by a French scholar in 1818. An aerial 
photography system hanging from a large kite was experimented with by U.S. Army 
researchers as early as the 1890s during the Spanish American War. William Eddy took 
hundreds of photographs from kites, which may have been one of the first uses of UAS in 
combat [91]. 
From that time on, many projects were developed to build unmanned aerial 
vehicles for military use, but they couldn’t really succeed until the development of three 
technologies necessary for operational use: 
• First, an aerial platform that could maneuver toward an appropriate 
objective 
• Second, a guidance system that would provide communication between an 
operator and the UAS 
• Third, a payload able to perform a useful mission 
In the following discussion of the historical development of unmanned aerial 
systems, I will periodically refer to the progress made in these three areas. Where 
numerous similar systems were being developed at the same time, I will describe how we 




Even though the idea of building an unmanned aircraft had been around for a long 
time, the invention of the airplane naturally played a major role in developing this 
technology. The airplane provided a level of directional mobility that kites and balloons 
did not have: they could go up like a kite, they could move horizontally like a balloon, 
and they were more maneuverable and could be sent to any direction, not only the 
direction the wind blew in. This advance in technology solved the first problem of the 
three technological requirements mentioned previously.  
However, it was still too early for a more sophisticated guidance system for this 
new technology. Without a man onboard, the airplane would have little operational 
success. The U.S. and Britain both attempted to develop unmanned aircraft filled with 
explosives. 
For the U.S., Charles Kettering (of General Motors fame) developed a biplane 
UAV, known as "The Kettering Aerial Torpedo," "Kettering Bug" or just "Bug," for the 
Army Signal Corps. It took three years, could fly nearly 40 miles at 55 miles per hour, 
and carried 180 pounds of high explosives. These early UAS had a very simple guidance 
system. The UAS heading was slaved to a magnetic compass and its altitude was slaved 
to a barometric altimeter [92]. 
In 1917, the British tried to use radio control in their unmanned aircraft 
experiments. This was a significant advance but it did not work as expected. Thus, no 
unmanned aircraft successfully flew before the end of the war. Right after the war, both 
countries stopped nearly all work on these programs due to the budget considerations, 
allowing only for a modest research capability.  
The Germans also tried to develop unmanned aircraft. “Among their more 
innovative ideas was a remote control technology for guided missiles, which used a thin 
copper wire that reeled out behind the vehicle and kept it in contact with a pilot on the 





several flying bomb designs, including a glider that could carry 2,205 lb of explosive for 
about five miles.” German designs were not operational before the end of World War I 
[92]. 
C. INTERWAR YEARS 
Between World War I and World War II, all countries cut the funding for 
research. Because of this decreased funding, development of unmanned aerial vehicles 
continued very slowly. The British stayed ahead in the game and managed to build radio 
controlled target drones, named Fairy Queens, many of which crashed shortly after 
launch. In 1933, the Fairy Queen was used for the first time as a target drone for gunfire 
practice [93]. In April of the following year, one survived over two hours of heavy naval 
gunfire for testing purposes, showing a lack of effectiveness of the fleet's anti-aircraft 
weapons against unmanned aircraft and the future feasibility of remotely piloted aircraft 
[92]. 
Englishman Reginald Leigh Denny and two Americans, Walter Righter and 
Kenneth Case, developed a series of unmanned aircraft called the RP-1, RP-2, RP-3, and 
RP-4. They formed the Radioplane Company in 1939, which later became part of 
Northrop-Ventura Division. Radioplane built thousands of target drones during World 
War II [95]. 
D. WWII 
The desire to win World War II spurred countries on both sides to develop many 
new and more capable aircraft. The German V-l was the most known and notorious 
among the unmanned aerial vehicles used during World War II. It was a self-guided 
monoplane that carried explosives and flew a pre-set heading and time. When it reached 
the desired point, the engines would shut down and the aircraft would go into a dive and 
explode at the point of impact. After losing the Battle of Britain, the Germans could no 
longer conduct strategic bombing against the British. They decided to save their 
remaining manned aircraft and pilots for the Russian front. Thus, it was due to a scarcity 
of resources that Hitler and the German high command looked to expendable unmanned 
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aircraft to allow them to resume a strategic bombing campaign. This was the first large-
scale operational employment of unmanned aircraft. Even though the V-l campaign did 
not have a large military effect, a study by the British Royal Air Ministry pointed out that 
the V-l campaign cost the Allies four times more than it cost the Germans. Allied 
expenses included the destruction and lost civil productivity caused by the V-l's attacks, 
and the cost of Allied military operations against the V-ls. This campaign had a 
significant psychological impact too. Approximately 1.4 million people evacuated 
London by the second month after the V-l campaign started. Statistics from the V-l 
campaign are listed in Table 13 [92]. 
From June 1944 to 29 March 1945, 10,492 V-1 flying bombs were launched 
against England. Only 2,419 of them reached the desired targets. Of the rest, 1,847 were 
neutralized by Royal Air Force Spitfire pilots, who learned that placing the wing tip of 
their fighter plane underneath the V-1s outer wing would often cause the gyros to tumble, 
and send them crashing out of control before reaching their targets. Another 1,878 V-1s 
were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery and 232 were snagged by balloons [96]. 





Figure 56.   German V-1 "Buzz Bomb" 
 
 
In the meantime, the U.S. and Britain developed better guidance technology with 
radio-controlled aircraft as target drones [91]. Operators had to keep the unmanned 
aircraft within visual range due to the lack of an over-the-horizon guidance capability. 
Although the electronic computer was first demonstrated by IBM in the mid-1940s, it 
was not small enough for use in controlling unmanned aircraft. Furthermore, electricity 
consumption was substantial (80 kW) for this kind of a computer [97]. 
E. POST-WORLD WAR II, THROUGH PRE-VIETNAM 
After the WWII, there were many advances in UAS technology and tactics. The 
Cold War accelerated this progress. Competition between the Soviet Union and the 
United States played a major role for both sides. New and better platforms were 
developed, especially for unmanned use: 
In June 1944, the German army began the use of what would be a very unique, 
very deadly, and historical weapon called the V-1. The 'V' stood for 
Vergeltungswaffe which meant "vengeance weapon." Better known to 
Londoners as the "Buzz Bombs" or "doodlebugs," these flying bombs made a 
very distinctive sound as they flew overhead at low altitude, before the timing 
mechanisms expired, and the bomb fell to earth and exploded [96]. 
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• Surface-to-surface Cruise Missiles 
• Decoy Missiles 
• Standoff Cruise Missiles 
• Anti-ship Cruise Missiles 
• Photo Reconnaissance UAVs 
1. Surface-to-Surface Cruise Missiles 
The German V-l was the first and most primitive example of a cruise missile. 
During the post-war period, some evolutionary improvements were made with this 
technology, and both the U.S. and Russia developed long-range infiltration and attack 
systems that were able to carry nuclear payloads. These systems were not as effective as 
they were supposed to be because of their guidance systems. The guidance system, which 
was required to achieve better accuracy, was still beyond the technological capability of 
the day. Not only the U.S. but also Russia developed several cruise missile systems. The 
Matador, Mace, Snark and Navaho were the notable U.S. systems. 
In August 1945, the AAF required a surface-to-surface missile that had a 175- to 
500-mile range and 600 mph speed. In March 1946, the Glenn L. Martin Co. received a 
one year contract to study both a subsonic and supersonic version.  This started under 
project "MX-771," and the initial test launches of the "XSSM-A-1" and "YSSM-A-1" 
prototypes were conducted in 1949. The prototypes"XB-61" and "YB-61" were 
redesigned in 1951. The "B-61A" Matador was accepted for operational service in 1954. 
It was redesignated "TM-61A" in 1955.  
About 1,200 Matadors were built by 1957. This missile was stationed in West 
Germany, Florida, and Taiwan, and remained in service until 1962. The Matador-C was 




Figure 57.   The Martin TM-1 “Matador” (From [98]) 
 
Figure 58.   The First “Matador” Launched from Cape Canaveral (From [98]) 
 
The "Matador-A,” to simplify the issue of what to call it, was a mid-sized pilotless aircraft, with a 
high-mounted swept wing and a tee tail. It differed from the X/YB-61 prototypes, which had wings 
mounted on the midbody and a spindle-shaped fuselage. The Matador-A was launched by a single 
Aerojet-General solid fuel booster with 254 kN (25,850 kgp/57,000 lbf) thrust, the booster being 
discarded after launch. It was one of the first aircraft of any type to use such a "zero length launch" 
scheme. In cruise flight, it was propelled by an Allison J33-A-37 turbojet engine with 20.5 kN 
(2,090 kgp/4,600 lbf) thrust, with the air intake set flush into the missile's belly.  [98] 
The Martin TM-61 
Matador became 
the Air Force's 
first operational 




To increase system mobility and because the radio guidance system of previous 
models was vulnerable to jamming, a new project was started in 1956. This was an 
improved version of the Matador. Initial test flights of "YTM-61B" prototypes started in 
1956. This system had a longer wingspan and a longer blunt nose. In early 1958, it was 
designated as "TM-76 Mace" and entered operational service as the "TM-76A Mace-A." 
The Mace-A saw operational deployment with the 38th Tactical Missile Wing from 1955 
to 1969. 
 





The Air Force installed a jam-proof inertial guidance system aboard the Mace 
"B." To enhance mobility, Martin designed the Mace's wings to fold for transport. 
Development of the "B" missiles began in 1964. The TM-76B/MGM-13C continued in 
operational status until December 1969 [99]. 
The U.S. Air Force was in need of a long-range missile and in January 1946, 
Northrop submitted designs for turbojet-powered long-range cruise missiles. In March 
Mace was an improved version of the Matador. Like its predecessor, the Mace was 
a tactical surface-launched missile designed to destroy ground targets. It was first 
designed as the TM-76 and later the MGM-13. It was launched from a mobile 
trailer or from a bomb-proof shelter by a solid-fuel rocket booster that dropped 
away after launch; a J33 jet engine then powered the missile to the target [99]. 
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1946, Northrop’s project was accepted and a development contract for project MX-775, 
covering the subsonic Snark (MX-775A) and the supersonic Boojum (MX-775B) was 
signed. In late 1947, the missile designator SSM-A-3 was assigned to the Snark, while 
Boojum was designated as the SSM-A-5. The first successful launch for XSSM-A-3 was 
in April 1951.  
 




In 1955, the Air Force introduced a new designation system for its guided 
missiles, and after that the XB-62 was redesignated as XSM-62. The projected XRB-62 
reconnaissance version, which was later cancelled, became the XRSM-62.  
The last test model was the N-69E (designated YSM-62A), which served as the 
prototype of the production Snark. The Snark eventually saw operational duty with the 
702nd Strategic Missile Wing from May 1957 to June 1961 [102]. The Snark was the 
only intercontinental surface-to-surface cruise missile ever deployed by the U.S. Air 
Force, but was operational for only a very short time. 
The severe reliability and accuracy limitations of the SM-62A, together with 
its significantly larger vulnerability to air defenses when compared to 
ballistic missiles, meant that the Snark could never be more than an interim 
emergency weapon [102]. 
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Concurrent with the Snark, another cruise missile was being built. This was the 
SM-64 Navaho. It was also a long-range supersonic missile that was launched vertically. 
However, the Navaho never become operational [103].  
Despite the fact that the Navaho program was canceled before it was operational, 
test launches resulted in much technical advancement. The inertial guidance system 
developed for Navaho was used in the USS Nautilus and enabled it to be the first 
submarine to travel under the polar ice cap [104]. 
 
Figure 61.   SM-64 Navaho Missile (From [104]) 
 
The best Air Force reliability rating for the Mace was 70% and it had a 500 yard 
CEP. The Snark was not reliable, either, and never met its required CEP of 8,000 yards. 
The Navaho could cruise at mach 3.25 for 5,500 miles, but it was very unreliable at the 
distances it was designed to travel, and very inaccurate. These three cruise missiles were 
not as successful as expected due to their new guidance technologies that were still not 
mature enough to provide the required accuracy. The Matador used LORAN, a long-
range radio navigation system, and ATRAN (automatic terrain recognition and 
Eleven Navaho missiles were 
launched from the Cape 
between 1956 and 1958. 
Designed and built by North 
American Aviation Inc., the 
Navaho was being developed 
as a supersonic 
intercontinental cruise 
missile. The program was 
canceled in July 1957 when 
the Atlas Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile was chosen 




navigation). The Snark used a combination of automated stellar navigation, and a inertial 
navigation system (INS). The Navaho used a variant of INS. “Because of their continued 
inaccuracies, these first and second generation cruise missiles were pushed aside by 
ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), which proved much more reliable, more 
accurate, and impossible to shoot down with any weapons available during that era.” 
[105][92] 
2. Decoy Missiles 
Decoy missiles are designed to confuse enemy antiaircraft weapons into attacking 
the decoy while the host aircraft escapes, increasing the survivability of strategic manned 
bombers. A notable U.S. design was the Quail. In October 1952, the Strategic Air 
Command issued requirements for an air-launched decoy that could be carried by its 
Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers and released just prior to penetrating enemy 
airspace. This would be used to confuse an enemy's defensive radar network with false 
echoes. The Quail had the identical radar image of the B-52 and flew at approximately 
the same speed and altitude.  The Quail could cruise at .9 mach for 445 nautical miles and 
it was preprogrammed to make two heading changes and one speed change during its 
flight. Quail became operational in 1960. The B-52s would carry four Quails. By 1969, 
Soviet radar systems became capable of distinguishing the Quail from its B-52 host, so 







Figure 62.   GAM-72 (ADM-20A) “Quail” (From [106]) 
 
 
3. Standoff Cruise Missiles 
These aerial vehicles allow strategic bombers to stay a safe distance away from 
heavily defended targets. This kind of missile is produced to compensate for the 
inaccuracy of the long-range cruise missiles such as the Snark. During this period, the 
most notable U.S. design was the North American Aviation Corporation AGM-28 Hound 
Dog, a supersonic, jet-powered, air-launched cruise missile. It had a maximum speed of 
mach 2.0 and a range of 675 miles. In addition, it could deliver a four-megaton nuclear 
weapon [92]. At first, it was designated B-77, later re-designated GAM-77, and finally 
designated AGM-28. Hound Dog was originally envisioned as a temporary stand off 
weapon for the B-52 until the AGM-48 Skybolt air launched ballistic missile could be 
deployed. But the Skybolt was canceled, leaving Hound Dog deployed for 13 years until 
replaced by newer weapons including the AGM-69 SRAM and the AGM-86 ALCM. B-
52s had the ability to carry two Hound Dogs, one under each wing. 
The ADM-20 was a relatively effective decoy against 1960s radars. However, in a USAF 
test in 1972, the Air Force radar operators were able to correctly identify the decoys in 21 
out of 23 cases. Because the Quail was apparently no longer a useful decoy, the Air Force 
began its phase-out, and in 1978 the last ADM-20C had left the USAF inventory. A total 




Figure 63.   AGM-28 Hound Dog (From [107]) 
 
 
4. Anti-ship Cruise Missile 
Anti-ship cruise missiles were designed most successfully by the Russians and 
sold to their client states. SS-N-2 Styx is the most well known Soviet design. One of the 
most important operational uses of an unmanned system during this era was during the 
1967 war between Egypt and Israel, when the Egyptians sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat 
with a single Soviet-built Styx missile [92]. The Styx was also used by India in 1971 
against Pakistan, and by Iran during its 1980–1988 war with Iraq. It is still operational in 
many countries [108].  
 
The Hound Dog was SAC's first air-launched missile.  One was carried under each wing of 
the B-52G Stratofortress.  Their mission was to attack and destroy enemy air defenses, such 
as fighter aircraft bases, communication centers, and anti-aircraft missile batteries, thus 
clearing the way for the bomber to more successfully strike its target.  It was named after the 




Figure 64.   SS-N-2 Styx (From [109]) 
 
 
5. Photo Reconnaissance UAS 
The Eastern Bloc countries were improving their military capabilities and the U.S. 
wanted to keep an eye on them. Photo Reconnaissance by manned aircraft was becoming 
more difficult due to improving anti-aircraft capabilities. After the shoot-down of the U-2 
spy plane by Russia, the U.S. was under great pressure to keep the Soviets under aerial 
surveillance. Another U-2 was shot down during the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 27 October 
1962, by a Soviet SAM over Cuba. These losses led the U.S. to adapt target drones for 
photoreconnaissance. The 147 family of UAS were built by the Ryan Aeronautical 
Company.  
 
China acquired the Russian SS-N-2 Styx missile technology in 1959, and 
production began in 1974. The Russian SS-N-2 was used in 1967 against 
Israel by Egypt, in 1971 by India against Pakistan, and by Iran during its 
1980-88 war with Iraq. Chinese copies of the Styx design (CSS-C-2 
Silkworm and CSS-C-3 Seersucker) coastal defense missiles and the ship 





Figure 65.   DC-130H Hercules drone control with a pair of AQM-34  (From [110]) 
 
The BQM-34 was demonstrated using existing photo reconnaissance cameras and 
redesignated 147A, with a high-resolution camera capable of 2-foot resolution. Later, a 
BQM-34 with larger wings, designed to fly at high altitude above 55,000 feet, was the 
first UAS designed specifically for the reconnaissance mission. Their first air launches 
from a C-130 proved the feasibility of the system and interceptions attempted by F-106s 
verified the effectiveness of the new stealth technologies in increasing the 147A's 
survivability against air defense radar systems [92]. After some modifications to this 
vehicle, the Ryan 147 B (AQM-34Q) was used operationally for intelligence collection 








F. VIETNAM THROUGH DESERT STORM 
Evolutionary development of UAS occurred during the period between the 
Vietnam War and the Gulf War. Not only were there several significant and successful 
operational uses of UAS during the period, but UAS were used by many different 
nations. The technology was maturing enough to provide the requirements for effective 
UAS, the three basic requirements previously discussed: “an aerial platform capable of 
maneuvering to an appropriate objective, a guidance system that permits over-the-horizon 
UAS operations and a payload that can perform a useful mission.” 
The Ryan Firebee was a series of target drones or UAS developed by Ryan 
Aeronautical beginning in 1951. It was one of the first jet-propelled drones, and one 
of the most widely-used target drones ever built.
Q-2: original drone designation 
BQM-34: drone capable of launching by several methods 
AQM-34: air-launched variant 
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New aerial platforms and advanced navigational accuracy were the main 
technological breakthroughs in the UAS world. The performance of UAS increased 
significantly: speed approached mach 4 and service ceilings reached almost to 100,000 
feet [112].  “In the U.S., Teledyne Ryan developed a family of unmanned vehicles that 
were used in a variety of missions including reconnaissance, signals intelligence 
collection, radar jamming, decoy for manned or other unmanned aircraft, and leaflet 
dropping.” [105] Unmanned aircraft were used in flak suppression, chaff dispensing, 
target designation and weapons delivery roles. Some tests of unmanned drone aircraft in 
air-to-air combat roles were conducted. The AQM-34 demonstrated dropping 500 lb 
bombs, dropping the Stubby-Homing Bomb (HOBO), and deployment of anti-radiation 
missiles to destroy anti-aircraft radar sites [111]. They started as preprogrammed drones, 
but evolved to have the capability of receiving guidance while in flight.  
After all these successful tests and demonstrations, the termination of the Vietnam 
conflict decreased the importance of the military use of UAS. The end of the Vietnam 
War resulted in a massive drawdown of U.S. military forces, including the elimination of 
Air Force UAV organizations in 1976 [113] “After the Vietnam drawdown, the Air Force 
appeared to lose all interest in UAVs, with little activity until the initiation of the Tier 2 
(Predator), Tier 2+ (Global Hawk), and Tier 3- (DarkStar) reconnaissance-surveillance 
programs.” [111] In the meantime, Israel moved into the lead position in the production 
and operational use of mini-UAS.   
During this period, long-range guidance system technology also evolved. The 
U.S. developed a better and more effective generation of cruise missiles with Terrain 
Contour Matching (TERCOM), which "sees" the terrain it is flying over using its radar 
system and matches this to the map stored in memory, and Digital Scene Matching Area 
Correlator (DSMAC) navigation systems, which are usually employed on the approach to 
target. A DSMAC system compares a photograph of the target with the picture provided 
by an onboard camera. TERCOM and DSMAC systems increased the accuracy of a 
missile compared to the older and simpler INS. By using these systems, CEP decreased to 
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100 to 600 feet after traveling intercontinental distances. These systems allowed a missile 
to fly lower, making it harder to be detected by ground radar [92].    
In this period, there were tactical advances. Improving technology permitted the 
vehicles to maneuver during flight, unlike the older UAS that flew straight-line on a 
preprogrammed heading toward their targets or reconnaissance objectives. Some 
unmanned systems used a hybrid autopilot that allowed reprogrammable waypoints 
during the flight, or during critical phases of flight this system would allow a remote pilot 
to take over the control. Real-time telemetry and surveillance products could be sent back 
via wireless data links, allowing over-the-horizon remote guidance. This capability 
brought a flexibility and ability to take immediate action. Even though the unmanned 
vehicle was destroyed during a mission, data it transmitted before destruction would be 
beneficial and could be used as a valuable source of information [92]. 
Demand for UAS also increased worldwide. Many countries bought UAS from 
the world's leading producers to replace manned systems, due both to the increased 
relative effectiveness of anti-aircraft missiles and radar guided anti-aircraft artillery 
systems, and a desire to accomplish reconnaissance missions without getting recognized. 
The family of 147s (147A, 147B, AQM-34, BQM-34) is the longest sustained 
UAS to date. It was first launched in 1951 and is still operational. It was also used in the 
Vietnam War for reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam.  During this period, it was 
used over China, Cuba, and Russia as well. During the Vietnam conflict, more than 1,000 
Ryan “Lightning Bug” remotely piloted vehicles flew 3435 combat missions with a 4% 
loss rate; this prevented many potential international incidents and the loss of many much 
more expensive manned aircraft and crew [113]. 
Israel employed UAS with innovative tactics. According to authorities, one of the 
keys to the success of the Israelis was the clever use of UAS during operations. During 
the Six-Day War, on 5 June 1967, Israel used UAVs as decoys in their air raids against 
Egypt. The Israelis sent numerous UAS against Egyptian facilities right before they sent 
their real attack forces. The Egyptian air defense forces fired on the incoming UAS, 
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which appeared to be Israeli aircraft on the radar display, and during the reload period 
manned aircraft attacked Egyptian defense systems and neutralized most of them [92]. 
Another significant operational use of UAS by Israel was in 1982 in the Bekaa 
Valley. Israel used Northrop Chukar target drones to draw fire from the Syrian’s new SA-
6 systems, by which they learned necessary information about the frequencies used by the 
missiles' search, tracking, and missile activity functions. This data was used to jam SA-6 
systems during air attacks.  
 
Figure 67.   BQM-74 “Chukar” (From [110]) 
 
 
Israel also used their Mastiff and Scout mini-UAS, which flew numerous 
reconnaissance sorties and provided real-time television images of hostile activities, such 
as aircraft launches and recoveries, to E2C command and control in Southern Lebanon. 
Because the Israelis knew from where and when and what type of air threats were coming 
in advance, the IAF had a aircraft kill ratio of 95:1 [115].   
The BQM-74 Chukar is a series of aerial target drones produced by Northrop. The 
Chukar has gone through three major revisions, including the initial MQM-74A 
Chukar I, the MQM-74C Chukar II, and the BQM-74C Chukar III. They are 
recoverable, remote controlled, subsonic aerial target, capable of speeds up to Mach 





Figure 68.   Israeli Malat Mastiff (From [117]) 
 
 
Figure 69.   IAI MALAT Scout (From [117]) 
 
 
G. DESERT STORM THROUGH PRESENT 
Increased computer processor speeds and data transfer rates have led to a new era 
in UAS manufacturing. Miniaturization of technology has resulted in smaller payloads 
and aerodynamically more efficient UAS. There has also been an increased desire for 
detailed, near-real-time information about the location and disposition of enemy forces. 
The technology has become mature enough to provide for this desire. “Gulf War after 
The Scout remained in service with the Israeli Army until the early 1990s, when it was 
replaced by the IAI Searcher [116]. 
Three generations of the 
Mastiff developed by Tadiran 
were in operational use by the 
IDF performing numerous 
operational missions; the most 
well known of them was flown 
during the first Lebanon war 
when Yasser Arafat was caught 




action reports noted that intelligence gathered by national collection assets did not get to 
the commanders in the theater of operations that needed it. In contrast, many senior 
military commanders spoke high praise for the few UAS available to operational 
commanders during the Gulf War. The reason senior leaders praised the UAS was that 
they enabled decision makers in the theater of operations to have real-time or near real-
time, unfiltered information about an area of interest. As a result, UAS were in big 
demand during the United States' operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.” [105] 
The Pioneer, a joint Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and AAI Corporation 
development, was the most versatile system used in the Gulf War. The system was 
designed to perform unarmed battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance missions. It was 
launched from land or at sea via catapult or runway. Endurance and flight time varied 
depending on the payload but in general it could fly several hours. The Pioneer system 
can send real-time information through analog video by way of a line-of-sight (LOS) data 
link. The RQ-2 Pioneer system played a role in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Somalia, 
Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq under the U.S. Army, Navy and Marines. It also has seen 
service with forces sponsored by Israel and Singapore [118]. 
 
Figure 70.   RQ-2 “Pioneer” (From [120]) 
 
 
Pioneer was procured starting in 1985 as an interim UAV capability to provide 
imagery intelligence (IMINT) for tactical commanders on land and at sea. In ten 
years, Pioneer has flown nearly 14,000 flight hours and supported every major U.S. 
contingency operation to date [119]. 
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In response to earlier operations in Grenada and Libya, the Navy started 
the Pioneer UAV program in the late 1980s. By the time Iraq invaded 
Kuwait in 1990, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army all operated UAS. 
With 85% of the U.S.’s manned tactical reconnaissance assets committed 
in Kuwait, UAS emerged as a must have military asset. Six Pioneer 
systems (three with the Marines, two on Navy battleships, and one with 
the Army) participated. They provided highly valued, near-real-time 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) and BDA, day 
and night. They often worked with JSTARS, the airborne battle 
management and C2 platform, to confirm high-priority mobile targets. 
[121] 
During the Gulf War, the U.S. Navy flew Pioneer for 213 hours and 64 sorties. 
These UAS took off from the battleships U.S.S. Missouri and U.S.S. Wisconsin and 
conducted target selection, naval gunfire support, battle damage assessment, maritime 
interception operations, and battlefield management missions. They detected many Iraqi 
patrol boats, and played a major role during the destruction of two high-speed boats. 
They were also successful in locating two Silkworm anti-ship missile sites, and were used 
to identify more than 320 ships. Moreover, they were used to locate AAA positions, and 
they were actively deployed for pre- and post-assault reconnaissance of Faylaka Island. 
As the war progressed, surrendering Iraqi troops and the retreat of major armored units 
were identified by Navy Pioneers.  
The Army's Pioneers flew 155 hours and 46 sorties. They provided a quick-fire 
link that allowed the targets they identified to be quickly engaged by other systems. 
Army Pioneers were also used to increase the situational awareness of the commanders 
by targeting, route reconnaissance, and battle-damage assessment (BDA).  
Obviously, these operations showed that Pioneers had the potential to fill the gap 
between manned aerial platforms and satellite-reconnaissance platforms. Furthermore, as 
the RF-4s were retired, one of the primary uses of Pioneer was to fill the gap created by 
the retirement of manned reconnaissance aircraft [122]. Marine Pioneers flew 318 hours 
and 138 missions during Operation Desert Shield and 185 missions and 662 hours during 
Operation Desert Storm [105]. 
125 
 
During operations in the former Yugoslavia, three types of UAS were actively 
used. These systems were Pioneer, Hunter, and Predator and they were in action as part 
of U.S. operational forces. There was an evolutionary development in UAS technology: 
the combination of the Predator UAV; commercial satellite TV technology; and a wide 
bandwidth, secure tactical Internet connection through fiber-optic cables and commercial 
satellite transponders. This technology resulted in a much higher data transfer rate. The 
Predator and the Bosnia Command and Control Augmentation (BC2A) transmitted live 
images to theater commanders via the Joint Broadcast Service. Commanders received 
their 30 megabit-per-second downlinks over direct broadcast satellites. This was 
approximately 3,100 times more than the data rate of 9.6 kilobit-per-second allowed by 
the modems available during the Gulf War [124]. 
During the conflict in Bosnia, the main concept for targeting was dependent on 
UAS, which were sending data to the combined air-operations center (CAOC). This 
intelligence was then distributed to strike aircraft. As part of this concept, the Predator 
worked successfully in the Balkans to support NATO, the United Nations, and U.S. 
forces. Predator carried payloads of electro-optical infrared (EO/IR) and line-of-sight and 
ultra-high-frequency (UHF) satellite communications (SATCOM) data links. 
UAV/JSTARS interoperability was also demonstrated. During the conflict, the Predator 
UAV not only flew over 20,000 hours but also accomplished several combat missions 
over the Kosovo engagement zone. During Operation Allied Force, The Predator was the 
best evidence of the successful integration of UAS into the complex command, control, 
communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) architecture [121]. 
Afghanistan’s rough terrain was a great challenge for fighters and bombers; 
twenty-four hour orbiting was a must for the allied forces. Continuous coverage of the 
battle space with responsive reporting and engagement of time-sensitive targets was 
supplied by ISR platforms. Voice or data-link transmissions were used successfully for 




Figure 71.   MQ-1 Predator armed with an AGM-114 Hellfire (From [126]) 
 
 
In Afghanistan, Predators armed with Hellfire were used after some 
modifications.  They were used against both stationary and moving targets. Both 
reconnaissance and strike assets were applied during the same mission without any risk to 
aircrew [125]. “In press releases issued on the 8th and 11th of February 2002, the 
Department of Defense confirmed that the CIA was using armed Predator UAS in 
Afghanistan, and a reference was made to a 4 February strike on a suspected Al-Qaeda 
complex near Zawar Kili in eastern Afghanistan.” [127] In October 2000, Predator had 
successfully fired the first Hellfire missile against a car that was carrying six Al-Qaeda 
suspects in Yemen.  The Global Hawk UAS was also flown over Afghanistan, but two 
vehicles were lost for technical reasons. The Global Hawk generated surveillance and 
reconnaissance images of potential enemy targets [128]. 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), UAS played a major role in intelligence 
gathering. The capability of sharing real time data made UAS vital for operations. 
An MQ-1 Predator armed with an AGM-114 Hellfire missile flies a 
training mission. The MQ-1's primary mission is interdiction and 




During OIF, the Predators were used to support the CAOC. In Iraq, Predators 
were used for ISR, and they carried Hellfire missiles [129]. 
 
Figure 72.   RQ-4A "Global Hawk" (From [130]) 
 
Global Hawks also played a very important role during OIF. They located thirteen 
surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, fifty SAM launchers, over seventy SAM transport 
vehicles and over 300 tanks in sixteen missions [130]. Even though Global Hawks flew 
only 5% of the OIF high-altitude missions, they accounted for 55% of the time-sensitive 
targeting against enemy air-defense equipment [131]. This result shows that the 
technology used today is at a point where we can maintain a high level of confidence in 
the performance of UAS. 
Today, there are numerous corporations that build unmanned systems. Northrop 
Grumman is one of them, making many UAS that are actively used by the U.S. and its 
allies. Walking through the history of this company’s involvement with UAS in the figure 
below can give us an understanding of the evolution of unmanned systems. New 
improvements in technology allow for better and more complex systems to be built. 
Tomorrow, unmanned systems will replace man in many activities.  
RQ-4A Global Hawk is a 
high-altitude, long-
endurance unmanned aerial 
reconnaissance system that 
provides military field 
commanders with high 
resolution, near real-time 





Figure 73.   Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Systems 
 
Figure 74.   Past sixty years of Northrop Grumman UAS 
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VI. MERGING POINTS OF EW AND UAS 
This chapter is a synthesis of the first five chapters. It is also the main step to 
determine the possible EW tactics for single or multiple UAS over the net-centric 
battlefield. Two of the major research question will be answered at the end of this 
chapter: 
• What are the merging points between UAS and EW? 
• How can we use UAS more effectively for EW purposes? 
In the previous chapters, I gave general information about EW and UAS, and also 
discussed the historical perspective in both areas. It is clear that UAS have been used in 
the battle area for electronic warfare purposes since the Vietnam War. With improving 
technology, UAS become more involved in the EW arena.  
A. UAS PAYLOADS 
Payloads are the determining factor for the role of UAS on the battlefield. With 
recent developments, EW payloads are getting smaller so that they can be inserted in 
mini or even micro UAS. This has a major effect on the planning process for UAS 
employment. 
We can classify five general payload types that account for the majority of current 
and projected UAV applications: information collection (sensing), communications 
support, navigation support, weapons delivery and electronic warfare. While the first 
three are used for both military and civilian applications, the last two are limited mainly 
to military purposes [132]. 
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1. Generalized UAS Avionics Architecture 
 
Figure 75.   Generalized UAS Avionics Architecture (From [132]) 
 
In Figure 75, the elements of a modern UAS avionics suite are shown, 
deliberately drawn to emphasize similarity to the modular, integrated avionics of complex 
manned aircraft. Only the most advanced multifunction UAS will incorporate all of these 
avionics elements as depicted.  “The basic features of modular fault tolerant hardware, 
high capacity fiber optic  interconnects, and shared high performance digital signal and 
data processing are characteristic of any design that seeks to take maximum advantage of 
available technology to achieve high performance, reliability, and affordability.” [132] 
Radio Frequency (RF) Payload Apertures: Radar, spectral surveillance 
functions that include RF radiometry and signal monitoring, and specialized apertures 
such as interferometers that are used in order to make an accurate determination of the 
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direction of the coming signal use payload antennas. Broadband data links for SATCOM, 
line of sight (LOS), or relayed data communications required by the payload are also 
found in this area.  
RF Support Electronics: This is associated transmit and receive electronics, 
communicating via a high speed digital typically fiber optic network. These are placed 
behind the antennas. 
Vehicle Management: Highly reliable flight, propulsion, and utility controls with 
the capacity to execute sophisticated adaptive control. Signals from flight data sensors are 
also processed here. 
Navigation: Used for obtaining vehicle position. Accuracy of this application is 
vital. One highly accurate and popular solution is an Inertial navigation unit (INU) 
integrated with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. 
EO/IR Apertures: Sensors like optical or IR cameras, multi- or hyper-spectral 
sensors, and active devices.  
EO/IR Support Electronics: Signal conditioning, preprocessing, and analog-to-
digital conversion support The EO/IR apertures [132]. 
These are the supporting functions:  
Core Processing: The heart of the payload is a high performance modular 
processor. This may be a fairly basic filtering, control, and data encoding computer in a 
simple UAV, e.g., a sensor platform that downlinks all data for processing on the ground. 
As the level of payload autonomy and the number of payload functions increase, the 
required throughput and memory can easily reach supercomputer levels. 
Power Conditioning: Sophisticated payloads need high quality electrical power. 
Prime power from an engine-driven generator or alternator will be rectified, filtered, 
regulated, and distributed by the electronics in this area. 
Command Link: One further RF function, usually physically separate for 
reliability, is the channel through which the platform exchanges control and status 
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information with operators. Data rates are modest, in the range of a few kbps, but high 
reliability, long range, and interference rejection are crucial [132]. 
The main focus of this chapter is the EW and EW related payloads. UAS can 
contribute in all aspects of Electronic Warfare, from jamming and Suppression of Enemy 
Air Defense (SEAD) to Electronic Warfare Support (ES), and Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT). The inherent range advantages enjoyed by EW/ES payloads make them the 
natural sensor of choice for cross-cueing payloads with shorter ranges and/or more 
restricted fields of view such as SAR or EO/IR sensors. EW fits for UAS can also include 
SIGINT payloads, or defensive sensors that can perform a SIGINT role. For example, a 
radar warning receiver (RWR) can be a source of vital information, particularly when 
related to imagery information to form a more complete or accurate situational awareness 
picture or when updating the electronic order of battle. The key is the integration of the 
inputs from all of the vehicle's sensors, or in the case of smaller more distributed systems 
that use a heterogeneous mix of sensors, all of the sensors on all of the vehicles. 
Studies, research and flight demonstrations prove that UAS can be utilized 
successfully for EW and SIGINT missions. “SIGINT sensors, for example, could be used 
to cue other sensors on a UAV, and they offered much longer detection ranges than 
EO/IR and SAR sensors.” [133] UAS are an ideal platform for carrying EA payloads. 
The UAS can approach closer to the target emitters compared with aircraft because of 
their smaller RCS; therefore they need less power for effective jamming.  
After the Cold War, the DOD intelligence community started showing an 
increased interest in UAS, and it has several mature programs to show for it. Two of 
today's most high-profile programs are the MQ-1/9 Predator and the RQ-4 Global Hawk. 
The Predator has been supporting U.S. war fighters since 1995, and the Global Hawk was 
flying over Afghanistan in 2001. “Both of these systems have been flying with interim 
SIGINT payloads for several years, and both are slated to receive new SIGINT 
capabilities in future years.” [133] 
UAS can play a very important role in the prosecution of EW campaigns. In this 
case EW has a vital role in the protection of UAS. To exploit this relationship, small-
133 
 
sized but effective EW equipment is needed. For example, a communications jammer or 
an electronic surveillance (ES) receiver can be used as the main payload. A RWR can be 
used as a UAS payload for threat warning.  
There is a great variety of payloads that can be used on UAS. Communications 
and electronic intelligence payloads; communications and radar jammers; electro-optic, 
infra-red, and MAW sensors; MTI and SAR radars; BDA sensors; communications 
relays; EW self-protection suites; chemical, biological, and nuclear detectors; target 
designators; and “horizon extenders” are some of the payloads that can be mounted on 
UAS for  EW purposes. 
2. Electronic Warfare Support (ES) and SIGINT Payloads 
ES and SIGINT sensors can supply very valuable information, especially when 
this information is a part of or related to imagery information used for forming a 
trustworthy situational awareness picture or for updating the electronic order of battle.  
Integration of the inputs from all of the sensors is the key to success. Furthermore, these 
sensors require less power because they do not transmit, but just receive and process 




Figure 76.   Geolocation error ellipses for 0.5 deg. rms DF sensors onboard 2 platforms 
with stand-off range of 100km. AOI (100km x 100km) is bounded by blue line. 
 
 
Figure 77.   Geolocation error ellipses for 5 deg. rms DF sensors onboard 8 platforms with 
stand-in capability. AOI (100km x 100km) is bounded by blue line. 
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Replacing Mini-UAS with larger UAS is not reasonable and is not considered 
practical right now, despite that fact a greater capability can be obtained by networking 
these UAS sensors. Figures 76 and 77 present a comparison between the 50% uncertainty 
bounds for geolocating emissions of interest from two platforms with 0.5 degree rms 
Direction Finding (DF) capability and eight platforms with 5 degree rms DF capability. 
For Figure 76, more accurate sensors are used from a standoff range of 100km. For 
Figure 77, cheaper, smaller and less accurate sensors are used on a smaller and more 
affordable stand-in platform. After analyzing these two figures, we see that with a less 
accurate sensor at a closer range, we can obtain errors around 50% less than the ones that 
carry a more expensive system. The relation between geolocation error and range for a 
variety of Direction Finding (DF) sensor accuracies can be found in Figure 78. 
Depending on the range, by using ES/ELINT sensors with very modest DF capabilities, 
situational awareness and even targeting level accuracies can be achieved, if stand-in 
capability is possible.  
 
Figure 78.   Geolocation Error (m) versus Range for 0.1-15 degree rms DF sensors 
enjoying optimum geometry. 
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There are several ways to determine the geolocation other than using DF 
techniques.  Increasing the sensors around the emitter decreases the error. If there is a 
single platform, we need to maneuver it relative to the emitter and increase the level of 
accuracy by obtaining the essential geometry to overcome the geolocation problem. This 
means that this platform should maneuver and collect information, which is very time-
consuming. If the emitter is mobile, this can cause extra complex calculation errors 
during these maneuvers. Using multiple platforms, geolocation can be performed in near 
real time. Moreover, this distribution provides a relative increase in the chances to reduce 
geolocation error. This provides a “double” incentive to obtain geolocation using multiple 
platforms [135]. 
 





3. Electronic Attack (EA) Payloads 
One payload functional area that is in advanced levels of development 
stage and will likely be an operational payload in the near future is 
electronic attack. The reason for this technological advancement is partly 
due to the aviation industry’s successful integration of EA technologies 
into combat aircraft and their EA pods. For years, industry has worked to 
miniaturize and advance the technology needed for sophisticated EA 
hardware in combat aircraft. Now, several organizations are successfully 
integrating EA technologies into UAS payloads. It is highly possible the 
UAS deployed in our next military endeavor will have some EA payload 
on board. [134] 
For self protection, jamming platforms must stand off at a considerable range 
from a target. Due to this fact, the jamming asset requires a large amount of power. If the 
size of the platform can be reduced and if it needs less or no protection, we are able to 
“stand in;” in this case, it would require significantly less power to jam a given target. 
Additionally, because the stand-in jammer is closer to its target and it transmits over a 
respectively smaller area, the potential for electro-magnetic fratricide is also significantly 
reduced. Figure 80 shows the Jammer-to-Signal Ratio (JSR) as a function of range for a 
100W jammer and 10kW radar transmitting into a 20dB directional antenna. The radar 
return is based on the detection of a target with a radar cross-section roughly the size of a 




Figure 80.   Jammer-to-Signal Ratio versus Range for a 100Watt noise jammer against 
10kW radar with 20dB antenna gain attempting to detect a target of 1m2 RCS. 
The red, green, and blue lines are for target ranges of 1, 10, and 100km. 
 
As seen in the figure, achievable JSR from a 100W jammer at a range of 10km 
from the radar is exactly the same as a 10kW jammer located 100km from the radar 
attempting to protect the same target. There are many modern weapons systems with 
ranges over 100km; providing more power requires a bigger platform. Miniature or 
smaller size UAS are hard to detect. Considering these facts, it can be said that UAS are a 
very attractive potential alternative. Furthermore, even if the mini-UAS are detected, 
targeted, and engaged, because of their very small IR signatures and RCS there is still no 
guarantee that the weapons will fuse correctly and destroy them. 
The Defence Science and Technology Organization (DSTO), which is a part of 
the Australian Department of Defence, conducted a series of trials to demonstrate the EW 
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capability of mini-UAS involved in maritime EW operations. The UAS was designed, 
built, and operated by Aerosonde Ltd. The payloads were designed, built, and operated 
by DSTO [135]. 
The payloads tested for EA were: 
• 1. EA ~ 100MHz bandwidth noise jammer 
• 2. RF repeater ~ a test target of controlled radar cross-section used with 
EA payload 
Some of the objectives for these trials were: 
• 1. To determine detectability of the UAS using the ship’s radars and ES 
• 2. To determine the effectiveness of the EA carried on the UAS 
During these trials, a navigation radar was used as a test-radar for the EA payload. 
A second UAS, with an RF repeater payload, was used as a controlled radar cross-section 
and flown in conjunction with the UAS with the EA payload. The navigation radar was 
successfully jammed.  
 




B. INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS 
The international market for UAS is growing daily. Most of the countries are 
considering small and medium-sized vehicles with EW payloads. 
In Germany, Rheinmetall Defence Electronics has been developing an EW 
version of the Kleinfluggerät Zielortung (KZO), which is used as a reconnaissance UAS. 
The German Army is interested in this project. The Mücke version of the KZO drone 
carries a VHF/UHF EA payload and also has a programmable radar jammer onboard that 
transmits in the 20 MHz to 110 MHz band or the 100 MHz to 500 MHz band to attack 
voice and data communications. Rheinmetall Defence Electronics has also developed the 
Fledermaus ES drone version of the KZO, which includes systems to intercept and 
acquire radar and radio transmissions that provide the position information and signal 
characteristics of the targets [136]. 
 
Figure 82.   The Mucke electronic countermeasures (ECM) UAV (From [136]) 





The Luftwaffe also requested that the European Aeronautic Defence and Space 
Company (EADS) build a SIGINT payload, 30 kHz to 30 GHz Integrated Signals 
Intelligence System (ISIS), for its EuroHawk UAS, which is built by Northrop Grumman 
[133]. An ELINT prototype was produced in 2003, and subsequent agreements between 
the U.S. and Germany and EADS and Northrop Grumman have been made for 
production of SIGINT systems in 2009. 
 
Figure 83.   Eurohawk (From [137) 
 
Saab Avitronics has developed a 16 kg ES Payload that can be mounted into a 
small UAS via its business units in South Africa. This payload consist of an acquisition 
and analysis receiver to detect the emissions of search, track and fire-control radars and a 
nose-mounted antenna array that covers the 0.5 to 18 GHz frequency band. The payload 
is based on Avitronics' Emitter Location System (ELS). 
Italy's Elettronica is working on ELT 819, a low-cost ES/ELINT payload. The 
focus of the payload is both passive and active radar jamming. Elettronica is also trying 
to develop non-military emission jamming.  
In China, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had an agreement with Xi'an ASN 
Technology Group Company to develop a short-range ISR and EW/EA UAS. ASN-206 
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UAS, with a JN-1102 EW/EA payload, was built for this purpose. Production began in 
1996. This UAS can jam communications at 20-500 MHz [138]. 
 
Figure 84.   ASN-206 (From [139]) 
ASN-206 multiple purpose UAS developed by Xi`an ASN technology group company. 
Design work was completed in Dec 1994. The western specialist said that the ASN-206 
was developed with the help of Israel Tadiran Ltd. 
 
Israel is one of the leading countries in the UAS industry. In September 2005, the 
Israeli government awarded a $50 million order for Israel Aircraft Industry's Heron UAS, 
which has a payload capacity of 250kg. This provides plenty of room for SIGINT, 
ELINT and COMINT systems. Though no EW systems have been confirmed for the 
Heron, IAI's ELTA Systems Group manufactures two EW payloads: the EL/L-8385 
Integrated ES/ELINT system and the EL/K-7071 Integrated COMINT system. Both of 
these systems are designed to perform long-range, high-endurance missions in dense 
radar environments, and both are intended for UAV applications and offer onboard 
processing [140]. Haifa-based Rafael produces the Top-Scan ES/ELINT system for UAS, 




Figure 85.   IAI-Malat Heron UAV (From [141]) 
 
At the 2006 Farnborough Air Show, Israel's Elbit Systems unveiled a version of 
its Hermes 450 tactical long-endurance UAS equipped with integrated electronic 
intelligence gathering systems by Elisra. Hermes combined Elisra's AES-210 ES/ELINT 
direction-finding system (1 GHz to 18 GHz and smaller than 22kg) with a new Tadiran 
COMINT 30 MHz to 3 GHz SKYFIX COMINT/DF package [142]. 
 
Figure 86.   Hermes 450s - UAV System (From [143]) 
The Hermes 450 features fully redundant avionics, fully autonomous flight, LOS and/or 
satellite communication data link with a fully composite structure that is highly mobile 
and easily deployed.  
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India works with Israel for its UAS needs. The state-owned Aeronautical 
Development Agency and IAI are working together to develop three new UAS for Indian 
military forces: the Rustam medium-altitude, long-endurance UAV, which features a 
domestically-developed EW system, the Pawan short-range drone and the Gagan tactical 
UAS, which also carries a domestically-developed EA system. 
Australia has developed various prototypes of EW payloads for its Aerosonde 
mini-UAV.  They have tested them against ground and shipboard radars [144]. EW 
payloads developed for Aerosonde Mini UAV are: 
ES Superhet Receiver: This unit weighs 2.7kg and operates in the 2-18 GHz 
Band. A separate datalink is used to transmit pulse descriptor words out to a range of 12 
km. The unit is installed in the Aerosonde with switching between two antennas, each 
with a beamwidth of 180 degrees. 
ES IFM Receiver: The IFM receiver also operates in the 2-18 GHz band with an 
RF resolution of approximately 4 MHz. The unit weighs approximately 3 kg and requires 
30W of payload power. This payload uses the same datalink as the ES Superhet. 
EA Noise Jammer: The noise jammer operates in two bands, high-band 8-12 GHz 
through tunable horns mounted in shields on either side of the aircraft, and low-band 850-
950 MHz through Yagi antennas mounted under the wings. 
RF Repeater (Jammer Test Target): The RF Repeater is developed to provide a 
target of selectable Radar Cross-Section to validate the masking performance of the 
jammer against a number of radars.  The repeater can generate an RCS of up to 10m2 and 




Figure 87.   Aerosonde mini-UAV (From [145]) 
 
 
Figure 88.   Aerosonde mini-UAV loaded with Antennas (From [144]) 
8-12 GHz tunable horns mounted in shields either side of the aircraft, and low-band 850-
950 MHz through Yagi antennas mounted under the wings  
 
Australia has made some evaluations of EW payloads for large and small UAS. 





Thrust exercise in Australia. The country's Defence Science Technology Organization 
(DSTO) has also conducted evaluations of several prototype EW payloads on an 
Aerosonde UAS. 
Today, the LR-100 ES/ELINT system is carried by Global Hawk Block 20. Block 
20s are also fitted with the Hyperwide COMINT package built by BAE systems. Neither 
of these systems is a long term answer to Air Force requirements. But obviously these 
systems make the Global Hawk more useful to the warfighters who are operating in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The Air Force has disclosed few details about the SIGINT systems 
currently fitted on the Predator, but there are more developments anticipated in the 
coming years. 
In the U.S. (as mentioned above) the LR-100 ES/ELINT system produced by 
Northrop Grumman is the main UAV SIGINT activity focus for the RQ-4A Global Hawk 
program. It weights 27 kg and transmits within the 2-18 GHz (baseline) range. Northrop 
Grumman is developing a variant of its ASIP for the Block 30 RQ-4B [142]. Advanced 
SIGINT Payload (ASIP) is the newest program approved for the Global Hawk and the U-
2S in October 2003. Northrop Grumman started manufacturing the portions of the ASIP 
sensor suite that can be traced back the Joint SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF) program's 
High-Band Subsystem in 1997. Other portions of ASIP were started in 1999 [133]. 
Four contractors have been selected to develop four low-cost, off-the-shelf, 
miniature EW payloads for integration into the Hunter UAS [146]. Raytheon E-Systems 
Melpar developed a 30-lb ES payload for the communications electronic support (ES) 
mission. This payload is expected to conduct precision direction finding (DF) and 
geolocation in the HF, VHF and UHF bands. Naval Air Warfare Center-Indianapolis 
(NAWC-IA) built a 47.5-lb communications jammer consisting of a receiver/exciter, 
power amplifier and antennas. It also has a "smart" processing subsystem that is used for 
autonomously recognizing and jamming the enemy VHF and UHF transmissions. Litton 
Amecom built an under-50-lb RWR/ES system with a 500-MHz bandwidth and VME 
processor as radar EW. Northrop Grumman's Electronics & Systems Integration Division 
started manufacturing the Tactical Radar Jammer (TRJ), which was designed to counter 
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pulsed, pulsed-Doppler and continuous-wave radar threats. This system is capable of 
finding, identifying, and electronically attacking radar emitters. This jammer offers a 
variety of EA techniques, including range gate pull-off, velocity gate pull-off, and 
multiple false targets [147]. 
The French arm of Thales Land and Joint Systems offers the TRC 274 VHF/UHF 
jamming payload for tactical to medium- or high-altitude, long-endurance 
(MALE/HALE) types of UAS. This is a 20-3,000 MHz, multimode communications 
jammer. They are also manufacturing 2-3,000 MHz TRC 6200 intercept and direction-
finding (DF) equipment for UAS that range in size from tactical to strategic. 
In the UK, Selex Galileo's business has been manufacturing the Passive Littoral 
Surveillance System (PALS), which provides geolocation of radar emitters. The PALS is 
scheduled for testing on Selex Galileo's Falco and Alenia Sky Y UAS in the near future. 
The Compact Techniques Generator, a Digital RF Memory (DRFM)-based radar jammer 
for UAS, is also being produced by Selex [138]. 
 
Figure 89.   The Sky-Y (From [148]) 
The Sky-Y is the first unmanned surveillance vehicle in the Medium Altitude Long 




Pakistani contractor East West Infiniti produces the 0.5-4,000 MHz ECOM 
Whisper Watch SIGINT payload for UAS [146]. 
Despite the fact that the U.S. has a leading role in the UAV payload market for 
EW and SIGINT systems, many international EW and SIGINT companies are involved 
in this competition, and they are aiming toward a bright future and business 
opportunities. Israel will undoubtedly stay as another dominant force in the UAS market. 
Even though other international companies are presently not involved heavily, they 
should not be underestimated; “many are simply waiting for a better moment to push into 
the market.” [138] 
There is an increasing demand for EW payloads all over the world. Today, few 
systems meet all requirements. Nevertheless, advances in the EW field are yielding 
impressive results that are being integrated into UAS payloads.  
1. Suppression of Enemy Air Defense 
The two radio calls that the leader of a strike package wants to hear during 
his ingress are “Viper 21, Magnum SA-3” and “Prowler 33, Music on.” 
They mean the SEAD F-16CJs and the EW EA-6Bs are doing their job in 
locating the enemy surface-to-air-missile (SAM) systems and keeping 
them from threatening the strike package. What isn’t reassuring is that 
these systems are in short supply. The availability and ability to 
sufficiently accomplish the mission in the near future may be jeopardized 
due to more capable enemy Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS). The 
question is whether a UCAV should do this “dangerous and dirty but 
certainly not dull mission. [149] 
The U.S. DoD defines the term SEAD as an “activity which neutralizes, destroys, 
or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or 
disruptive means.” There are records of two Predator UAS strikes in Iraqi Freedom in 
March 2003: one against an antiaircraft vehicle another against a television satellite dish. 
It is also known that Predator has been used successfully as a SEAD asset in Kosovo. A 
new version of the Predator, Predator B, will be able to carry eight Hellfire missiles. The 
U.S. is also working on UCAVs that will be the newest platforms with a primary 




Figure 90.   Predator UAV with Hellfire-C (From [151])  
 
C. THE FUTURE OF EW PAYLOADS 
In the near future, it is expected that UAS will have a larger SEAD role. 
Autonomous stand-in (close-range) jamming and decoy UAS will be used against well 
established integrated air defense systems [138]. 
 
Figure 91.   UCAV (From [152])   
UCAVs are seen as future weapon systems for projection of long range, sustainable, 
lethal, combat power  
The SEAD mission will most likely performed by a variety of SEAD UCAVs. 
The miniaturization of weapons that can create enough destruction is the limiting factor 
for this concept. With the advancing technology, there will be dedicated SEAD UAS that 
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will accompany counterair weapon systems into hostile territory to provide the additional 
SEAD protection necessary for combat operations [134]. 
Other authorities expect that UAV ES payloads will be used as passive detection 
devices to guard, as an example, shipping lanes and fisheries.  
There are also some predictions that the ISR community will show even more 
interest in UAS to replace manned aircraft. [138] 
D. SUMMARY OF UAS INVOLVEMENT IN ELECTRONIC WARFARE 
As mentioned in the first chapter, EW has three subdivisions: EA, EP and ES.  
The missions under the EA and possible UAS integrations are listed: 
1. Electromagnetic Jamming: 
Jamming payloads for UAS are being produced and integrated into a variety of 
UAS. Stand-in capability by UAS should be considered as a very important advantage. 
The closer the point of transmission, the less power required. Getting closer to the target 
will provide a more effective capability using the same amount of power. All kinds of 
jamming tactics can be used, depending on the size of the payload. Range gate pull-off, 
velocity gate pull-off, and multiple false targets are some of the techniques that can be 
offered. 
Another possible EA payload might be a GPS jammer. Jamming adversary GPS 
systems would help protect high value targets. Considering that most of the new 
technology weapon systems use GPS as the primary guidance system, deceiving them 
can prevent friendly force losses. 
2. Electromagnetic Deception 
While attacking a target, deploying decoys is a way of using deception. Another 
technique would be sending decoys prior to the real attack force, as was done during 
Bekaa Valley, Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. While the adversary 
is reloading weapons, a very well-planned attack would bring victory with no or little loss 
of friendly forces. 
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Repeaters can be used as a means of EA. They can provide a target of selectable 
RCS to validate the masking performance of the jammer against a number of radars. With 
the false target indication on the radar, other more important assets can be protected. 
3. Directed Energy 
Today, there are ongoing research and test programs concerning Directed Energy 
Weapons (DEW). The latest known development is mounting a DEW on a C-130H 
aircraft. The directed-energy weapon is designed to fire through a rotating belly turret in 
the aircraft, known as the Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) [157]. 
“First firing of the high-energy laser aboard the ATL aircraft shows that the 
program continues to make good progress toward giving the warfighter an ultra-precision 
engagement capability that will dramatically reduce collateral damage," said Scott 
Fancher, vice president and general manager of Boeing Missile Defense Systems [153]. 
 
 
Figure 92.   A C-130 Carrying An Advanced Tactical Laser (From [153]) 
A C-130 transport aircraft carries the Advanced Tactical Laser, which 





Today’s technology is not mature enough to integrate DEWs into small-to-
medium-size UAS because of the size issues of these systems. While the research is 
ongoing for both DE systems and UAS, it does not seem possible to merge these systems 
into the even larger UAS in the near future. Nevertheless, advances may allow this to 
happen.  
4. Anti Radiation Missiles 
SEAD has already been conducted by UAS. For more effective SEAD missions, 
miniaturization of the weapons with the necessary destructive power, so that they fit onto 
the UAS, is a vital need. For example, the HARM missile, which can be deployed from a 
Predator B, may change the total concept of SEAD operations in the future.  
5. Expendables (Flares and Active Decoys) 
Even though there is no known application of UAS carrying chaff or flares, or 
being used as an active decoy, it seems possible. In particular, using UAS as an active 
decoy is very possible to provide protection for slow flying aircraft. 
The missions considered as ES are: 
6. Threat Warning 
With the impressive advances in the manufacturing of electronic sensors, 
payloads became small enough to fit in the even small-sized UAS. A Radar Warning 
Receiver (RWR) can be used as a UAS payload for threat warning.  
7. Collection Supporting EW 
ES sensors can supply very valuable information for forming situational 
awareness and the big picture or for updating the electronic order of battle.  Integration of 
the inputs from all of the sensors is the key to success. UAS can carry systems that 
intercept and acquire radar and radio transmissions and can send this information of 
signal characteristics of the targets in real time to operation centers. 
8. Direction Finding 
The accuracy of DF is increased as more platforms are available to gather data. 
Relative geolocation error versus the number of DF sensors located around an emitter is 
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shown in Figure 79 in this chapter. UAS can play a very important role for this operation, 
because they are cheaper and do not carry humans onboard; they can be sent and risked in 
enemy territory. Furthermore, because they are small and relatively insignificant, most 
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VII.  POSSIBLE TACTICS AND CONCEPTS OF MINI-UAS FOR 
ELECTRONIC WARFARE MISSIONS IN THE NET-CENTRIC 
BATTLE AREA 
The technology that is being incorporated into the UAV systems is 
continually advancing. State-of-the-art technologies such as Synthetic 
Aperture Radars, increasingly capable microprocessors, increased data-
link rates, radar-absorbing materials, the use of high bandwidth 
communications, and SATCOM-equipped navigation systems, are being 
integrated onto the platforms making them a key asset to militaries world-
wide. Another key reason for UAV mission success is the UAVs’ low 
flying altitude and slow speed that makes them difficult for traditional 
enemy sensors to detect or recognize. UAVs may not be limited to the 
operating restrictions placed on manned aircraft – they have been sent on 
missions over enemy territory, against sophisticated integrated air defense 
systems – missions that would have to be thought twice about for manned 
aircraft due to cost or liability. With UAV operations, loss of human life is 
not a consideration making the decision to perform a high-risk mission 
easier. [155] 
In Section 220 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 (Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat 1654A-38), one of the key goals 
stated by Congress was that by 2010, one third of the aircraft in the operational deep 
strike force should be unmanned. Considering that we are almost at 2010, tactics for 
effective UAS deployment should be generated and discussed now. It is inevitable that by 
the end of this century, UAS are going to replace conventional manned aircraft. 
Using the information from Chapter VI and my experience with UAS in the 
COASTS program, in addition to my knowledge as a fighter pilot, possible operational 
EW tactics for single or multiple UAS over the net-centric battlefield are discussed in this 
chapter. 
UAS operational tactics are considered classified. The tactics mentioned here are 
a product of this thesis and they depend on certain assumptions by the author. 
UAS size, endurance, speed, maneuverability, autonomy, networking, 
survivability concerns, controllability, take-off and landing capabilities, sensors, and 
weapons carried are all pertinent factors for determining the best tactics; the operator’s 
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level of training and type of mission must also be taken into consideration. Whether, 
manned or unmanned, there are two general types of missions: preplanned and on-
demand [156]. 
• Preplanned missions are scheduled well in advance 
• On-demand missions can be launched quickly (within minutes) if an 
aircraft is ready and a crew is on site 
All of these factors are considered for determining the possible tactics in this 
chapter.  
A. LOITER 
UAS need to loiter to accomplish most of the missions. There are several types of 
loiter patterns that can be used with regard to the requirements of the mission. Below are 
some examples; many other combinations can also be used.  
 
Figure 93.   Loiter Types 
 
Loiter missions can be split into two basic types: standoff and overflight (or 
“penetration”). 
When the mission is too risky for overflight, standoff missions are flown. There 
can be some exceptions, but generally these are the missions flown with sensors, such as 
synthetic aperture radar (SAR), that do not look straight down. Sensors on penetrating 
platforms can look down and all around and can also cover more target area than a 





standoff sensor. This is true for weapons also, and weapons on penetrating platforms 
have the same advantages. This can be seen in Figure 94 [156]. 
 
 
Figure 94.   Penetration-Stand off Sensor Coverage 
 
Generally, manned military missions loiter over friendly territory, allowing 
sensors to look into enemy territory without endangering the crew. Stealth aircraft are 
designed for overflight, but they seldom loiter over hostile territory. Similarly, unmanned 
military missions can be also flown both ways. For example, Global Hawk mostly loiters 
over friendly territory [156]. Because of its bigger RCS and considering the cost of this 
UAS, this makes perfect sense. On the other hand, “Dark Star was stealthy and designed 
to fly over hostile territory, UCAV will also operate this way.” [156] But loitering over 
hostile territory might be risky for Dark Star, as well. Even though Predator is not a 
stealthy design, it often loiters over hostile territory [156] after the calculating all the 
risks; therefore, it is sometimes lost. For micro and small UAS, these risks drop down 
dramatically. Survivability against threat systems of these types of UAS is increased due 
to their smaller RCS; they do not pop up on the display of the most of the current 
technology radars. 
















B. JAMMING TERMS TO CONSIDER WHEN DEVELOPING NEW 
TACTICS 
We need to know some definitions about jamming in order to be able to produce 
tactics. As mentioned in the first chapter, jamming is a subset of EA that is conducted to 
degrade, neutralize, or destroy the enemy’s capabilities.  
 
 
Figure 95.   Jamming Types 
 




1. Stand-Off Jamming (SOJ)  
 
Figure 96.   Stand-off Jamming 
 
Stand-off jamming is the jamming conducted out of the range of the SAM, by 
which means the jamming platform does not risk being hit. During standoff jamming, the 
main aim is to jam all present threat bands: SAM and AI. Stand-off jamming requires 
high ERP. Today, this mission is generally done by the EA-6B and EA-18G. Larger UAS 
can also accomplish this mission through carriage of the required jamming payload. 
2. Escort Jamming 
 
Figure 97.   Escort Jamming 
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Escort Jamming is the protection provided by escort jamming platforms for single or 
multiple strike aircraft. EJ platforms escort the main attack group and cover them with 
more powerful jamming pods. Most stand-off jammers can also play an escort jammer 
role, if they are able to keep pace with the strike aircraft. 
3. Mutual Support Jamming 
 
 
Figure 98.   Mutual Support Jamming 
 
For mutual support jamming, there should be multiple jammers in the formation. 
On/off blinking or swept spot noise can be used for the best result. This is effective 
against launched active missiles. Synchronization of a jamming program over a network 











                                
 
 
Figure 99.   Stand-In Jamming (SIJ) 
 
Stand-in jamming is a fairly new concept. It is more suitable for UAS since they 
have a smaller RCS and can get closer without being detected. Additionally, if a UAS is 
lost to the defensive systems, no personnel are lost. The main idea behind this type of 




5. Self-Screening/Deception Jamming 
 
Figure 100.   Self-Screening / Deception Jamming 
 
Self protection EW/EA pods carried by fighter aircraft provide defensive action 
against hostile A/A and A/G missiles. These onboard pods are generally less effective 
than SOJ pods, and provide only partial coverage. Additionally, RWR is generally 
required to warn the aircrew of the threat and trigger the jamming response from the pod.  
C. ELECTRONIC JAMMING METHODS 
Jamming is often applied at critical times when enemy C2 and weapon system 
voice and data communications cannot be destroyed directly. All types of emitters can be 
jammed and deceived. 
The primary jamming methods are: 
• Radar jamming by using barrage, sweep, spot, multi-spot noise pulse, 
chaff, and decoys  






Figure 101.   Electronic Jamming Methods (From [4]) 
 
Jamming effectiveness depends on some number of technical factors. These 
factors are: 
• Target link distance (distance between the enemy transmitter and receiver)  
• The distance between the jammer and the enemy receiver  
• Radio LOS between the jammer and the targeted receiver 
• Antenna polarization 
• Effective radiated power of the jammer and the enemy transmitter 
• Weather, terrain, and vegetation [158] 
For a scientific approach to determining the most effective tactics, range and 
power calculations are essential. Below are some formulas used in jamming calculations. 
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POWER AT RADAR FROM JAMMER  
 
Figure 102.   Power at Radar 
POWER LEVEL RECEIVED FROM RADAR AT A JAMMER 
 
 
SELF PROTECT J/S 
J/S = ERPJ - ERPS + 71 + 20 Log d - 10 Log RCS 
 











SSJ BURN THROUGH RANGE 
Burn through Range is the distance at which target can be detected above 




J/S = ERPJ - ERPS + 71 + GRS - G - 20 Log dJ + 40 Log dS- 10 Log RCS   
 
Standoff Jammer Calculations – Mainlobe: 
 















The same formulas are used for SIJ as for SOJ.  
D. TACTICS FOR MINI AND MICRO UAS 
Mini UAS can be very valuable for EA and ES missions. Since they are small and 
difficult to see with the naked eye and have a relatively small RCS, they can accomplish 
these missions without being detected. Another advantage is their low cost when 
compared to manned aircraft and larger UAS. Furthermore, there can be numerous mini 
UAS deployed at the same time to increase the probability of mission accomplishment. It 
should not be forgotten that the shorter the range to the target used by the UAV, the more 
jamming power that is available against an enemy radar. It is also cheaper and technically 
easier to design and build UAS with stealth characteristics than it is for manned aircraft.  
These types of UAS can be hand launched or carried on manned aircraft as a 
payload; in the future, smaller (micro) UAS may potentially be carried into target area 
and dropped by a larger “mother-ship” UAS. 
1. Tactic 1 (Single Short Range Mini UAS EA Mission) 
Assumptions:  
• Old technology SAM 
• Mission can be either preplanned or on demand 
• UAS has short range 
• UAS is hand launched 
• UAS is launched into the hostile territory by well trained operator 
• There are two noise jammers mounted on the UAS, operating 
approximately 50-65 or 85-90 degree to the each side of the fuselage (or 
electronically adjustable)  
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Figure 104.   UAS Antenna necessities for Tactic 1 
 
In this situation, Special Forces with UAS training can be used. Just before the 
attacking aircraft penetrate the SAM ring, support jamming should be started to provide 
extra protection and a clear penetration corridor. In this case, the strike group enters the 
ring from a single corridor and flies over or under the UAS conducting the EA.  The UAS 
needs to sustain an elongated figure-8 loiter pattern to provide continuous jamming 
against the SAM radar. There will be a blind spot during the turns on the edges of the 
pattern. Search a pattern can also be used with the EA payload covering 85–90 degrees to 
either side of the fuselage of the UAS. In either case, blind spots are inevitable because 
during the turn coverage of the jammer will not cover the target for a certain amount of 
time without a jamming system with 180-degree-coverage. Most probably, side lobe 
coverage also will be insufficient. Considering that, with a 30 degree bank, a 180 degree 
level turn takes one minute, an aerodynamically mini UAS carrying an EA payload 
would not be very maneuverable; this blind time would change between 30 seconds to 60 
seconds, which is a respectively long duration. Unless the EA payloads can move 
electronically, this tactic can be considered weak if there is a coordination gap between 




















Figure 105.   TACTIC-1 
 
Additionally to succeed using this tactic, coordination of the aircraft with the 
UAS operator is vital. While the UAS is turning away from the radar, the attack group 
should not be within the range at which a SAM operator could target them; as a rule of 
thumb this range is two-thirds of the max range of the missile.    
2. Tactic 2 (Double Short Range Mini UAS Emission) 
Assumptions:  
• Old technology SAM 
• Mission can be either preplanned or on demand 
• There are two short range UAS  















• UAS are launched into hostile territory by well trained operator 
• There may be two UAS operators, but preferably one operator control both 
UAS over one ground control station (GCS)  
• There are one or two noise jammers mounted on the UAS, parallel to the 
fuselage 
 
Figure 106.   UAS Antenna necessity for Tactic 2 
 
In this case also, Special Forces with UAS training can be used. Just before the 
attacking aircraft penetrate the SAM ring, support jamming should be started to provide 
extra protection and a clear penetration corridor. This tactic provides continuous jamming 
coverage.  The strike group enters the threat ring from a single corridor and flies over or 
under the UAS conducting the EA; this should be coordinated beforehand.  The UAS 
need to fly a racetrack loiter pattern and they need to follow approximately the same 
ground track. While one UAS is turning outbound, the other one should be inbound 















Figure 107.   Tactic 2 
 
3. Tactic 3 (Single or Double Short Range Mini UAS EA Mission) 
Assumptions:  
• Old technology SAM 
• Mission can be either preplanned or on demand 
• There are one or two short range UAS  
• UAS are launched from an aircraft or a mothership UAS 
• There may be either one or two UAS operators on the aircraft depending 
on the number of UAS deployed  
• Jamming pods can be mounted on the UAS, either parallel or 
perpendicular to the fuselage (Figure 104/Figure 106) 









• If there is a mountain that can disrupt radar transmission of enemy radars, 
it can be used for hiding the control aircraft 
• Inside of the enemy area is considered too risky to send ground personnel 
 
In this case, the target is close to the border or Forward Edge of Battle Area. The 
aircraft, from which the UAS are deployed, is equipped with bigger antennas for 










Figure 108.   Tactic 3 
 
Hiding behind the mountains, the aircraft provides line-of-sight to the UAS. It can 
be carried as a payload on the aircraft. It can also be thrown from the ground and the 
controller on the aircraft can take over the controls. For the mountain not to shadow the 
transmission, relay UAS should be used for effective transmission. In this case, relay 
UAS should be thrown first.  The UAS should be thrown from a distance where it can 
glide up to orbiting jamming distance and reach the jamming altitude at around the same 
time. This would provide more battery and jamming time. While using this tactic, strike 
force must coordinate altitude and time before the attack.  Tactic 1 or Tactic 2 can be 










an extended range using a relay UAS for transmission and receiving. After the mission, 
UAS should be landed in a safe territory for picking up by the ground personnel. In case 














Figure 109.   Tactic 3 with Relay UAS 
 
All of the UAS can be deployed from the same aircraft or hand launched 
depending on the risk level over hostile territory.  
4. Tactic 4 (Multiple Short Range Mini UAS EA Mission) 
Assumptions:  
• This tactic can be deployed against new and old technology SAMs 
• Mission should be preplanned 












• UAS can be launched from either an aircraft or from a mothership UAS; 
they can also be hand launched 
• There will be numerous UAS operators  
 
Because there will be many UAS airborne, very good coordination between UAS 
frequencies is needed. Altitude de-confliction should be coordinated between UAS and 
the strike group. Using multiple UAS increases the probability of the success of the 
mission. Jamming can be conducted from either a single line or from multiple angles, 
letting strike forces enter the missile ring from different sides, providing greater 
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5. Tactic 5 (Decoy Tactic against SAM EA Mission) 
All warfare is based on deception 
      Sun Tzu                           . 
While attacking a target, deploying decoys is a way of using deception. Sending 
decoys in ahead of the real attack force was used to good effect in the Bekaa Valley, 
Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. While the adversary is reloading 
weapons, a very well planned attack would bring the victory without any or little loss of 
friendly forces. Decoy tactics have been widely used since the Vietnam War.  
Assumptions: 
• Against new and old technology SAMs 
• Mission should be preplanned 
• There are numerous UAS  
• High threat environment 
• UAS can be launched from either an aircraft, aircraft carrier, in front of 
the FEBA in friendly territory 
• There will be numerous UAS operators or UAS can fly pre-programmed 
flight plan 
 
Every SAM system can launch a certain number of missiles. When there are no 
missiles in the launcher they need to reload. This reloading period varies depending on 
the SAM type, experience of the personnel and equipment. Reload time ranges from 15 
minutes to 40 minutes. This is more than enough time to perform a successful attack. A 
variation of this tactic would be to send decoys against the target until the enemy has 
exhausted all his ammunition, and then attack against unguarded targets.  
During Desert Storm, BQM-74 drones and Tactical Air Launched Decoys 
(TALDs) were used. The Iraqis, after being decoyed and shooting these down, thought 
that they killed many aircraft. Following the decoys, a mass of seventy allied aircraft 




6. Tactic 6 (Decoy Tactic Against SAM and Air Interceptors EA 
Mission) 
Assumptions 
• Against new and old technology SAMs 
• Designed for self protection of the aircraft against SAMs 
• UAS are carried as a payload of an aircraft 
• UAS fly a pre-programmed flight plan 
 
This tactic can be utilized by aircraft that are supposed to attack a target inside the 
missile ring. Each additional decoy target return on the radar display decreases the 
probability that an actual attacking aircraft will be targeted by the defenders. If there is 
one target return on their screens, the enemy will engage this return. If we can produce 
multiple returns on the enemy’s radar display, this will increase our chances of survival 
accordingly.  In order to deploy this tactic, we should devote some of each aircraft’s 
payload to carrying decoys that can imitate the carrier aircraft’s RCS and characteristics. 
Every aircraft in the strike package should carry these decoys. Just before the package 
enters the interception ring, aircraft should deploy these decoys with a pre-programmed 
flight path in order to create more returns and decrease the probability of being locked by 
the radar. If a single attack aircraft carries two decoys, it will increase the chance of the 
enemy targeting a false echo by 66.6 %. 
This tactic can also be used against air interceptors. The general concept of 
interception depends on the beam or stern attack (considering that both sides have similar 
missiles with approximately same range). Deploying the decoy as the interceptors try to 
build the intercepting geometry, these decoys may be used in order to corrupt this 




             
                                                         




                                                          
                   
                                                   







   








Figure 114.   Effects of Using Decoy against Air Interceptor 
 
7. Tactic 7 (Multiple Short Range Mini UAS for Threat Warning-
Unknown Threat ES Mission) 
With the impressive advances in the manufacturing of electronic sensors, 
payloads became small enough to even fit into small sized UAS. A Radar Warning 
Receiver (RWR) can be used as a UAS payload for threat warning.  
During an operation, a UAS equipped with RWR can loiter at certain points on 
the path of a strike group. This UAS can give threat warning of adversary systems. The 
most important thing is to find the best spot for loitering. When deciding where to place 
the UAS, geographic conditions play a significant role.  UAS should be launched from 
behind obstructions (mountains, hills) that block reception of the aircrafts’ RWR. Also of 
importance is the networking and real time reporting to the Combined Air Operation 
Center (CAOC) or to the attacking aircraft.  
 
Flight Path of the Aircraft 
Flight Path of the Decoy 
Expected interception geometry 




















Figure 115.   Tactic 6 
 
8. Tactic 8 (Multiple Short Range Mini-Uas for Direction Finding-
Known Threat Es Mission) 
According to Joint Publications and DoD definitions, collateral damage means 
“Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be 
lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not 
unlawful, so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage 
TARGET









anticipated from the attack.” [159] With regulations and international laws, civilian 
casualties need to be avoided. For reduced collateral damage and civilian casualties, more 
accurate weapons and systems are needed. Today, there are very accurate systems to 
accomplish these kinds of missions. But unless the exact location of the target is known, 
these weapons will be ineffective.  
Assumption: 
• Target location is known but exact coordinates are needed for successful 
destruction 
To find the exact location, DF can be used. DF accuracy is increased with an 
increased number of platforms to gather data. UAS can play a very important role for this 
operation. And because they are small and relatively insignificant, enemy forces would 
likely not focus on them. 
During the operation, UAS equipped with DF equipment should be launched and 
loiter around the target. The more UAS are used, the more accurate the result obtained. 
The method of UAS employment can be determined based upon the threat environment. 
UAS may be either hand launched or deployed from aircraft or bigger UAS. Near real 
time data transfer plays a big role and is an absolute necessity. 
9. Tactic 9 (Multiple Short Range Mini UAS for Direction Finding-
Unknown Threat ES Mission) 
Assumption: 
• Target is a mobile SAM 
• Target location is changed before the operation and not known 
• Target threatens the success of overall mission 
• Target should be destroyed or avoided 
Sometimes, intelligence assets cannot locate the mobile target. In this case, the 
current position should be guessed from the last known position. The speed of the SAM 
should be determined from available intelligence, and a circle of range should be drawn. 
UAS with DF equipment are sent to this circle just before the strike group enters this 
area. Because this is a time critical mission, UAS are deployed from an aircraft or mother 
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ship UAS. These UAS search the area and transfer data to the Operation Center or 
directly to strike group aircraft. Operation commanders can decide upon the necessary 
action after evaluating the data. They can either decide to attack the SAM or avoid by 






VIII.  SCENARIO 
The purpose of this chapter is to postulate a war scenario and use the tactics 
produced in the previous chapter. This will provide an opportunity to evaluate these 
tactics and determine whether they are useful.  
A. COUNTRIES 
Xland and Yland 
 
Figure 116.   Xland and Yland 
 
B. POLITICAL STATUS 
There are political and territorial problems between these two countries. Yland is 
supporting terrorist groups in order to weaken Xland’s power and authority in the area. 
Yland lost the western part of its territory in the very beginning of the 20th century. Even 
though it has been more than a century since the last treaty, Yland still claims this 
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territory. Moreover, Yland is conducting nuclear research in order to develop a nuclear 
weapon, which in turn would threaten Xland’s security.  The new government in Yland 
clearly plays a hostile role, and continues to claim their lost territory. Xland has increased 
its defense status to the highest level. Briefly, while Xland wants to maintain the status 
quo, Yland wants to expand its boundary westward. 
A catastrophic terrorist bomb attack, which killed over 100 civilians in an Xland 
government building, was overtly supported by Yland. Xland has abandoned diplomatic 
efforts at conciliation and given way to the increasing percentage of its population that 
supports war. Xland declares war against Yland.  
C. FORCE SPECIFICATION 
Xland and Yland are two adjacent countries. Both Xland’s and Yland’s army and 
air force have mostly western weapon systems in their inventory.  
1. Xland  
SAM SYSTEMS: Patriot (PAC-1), Hawk, Nike 
AIRCRAFT: F-16 BLOCK 50, F/A-18F 
UAS: Predator, Mini EA/ES UAS  
2. Yland  
SAM SYSTEMS: Patriot (PAC-1), Hawk 
AIRCRAFT: F-16 BLOCK 50, Mirage 2000 







Figure 117.   Yland Defense Against Xland 
 
 
Figure 118.   Detection And Engagement Radar Coverage for 100 Feet 
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D. WEAPON SYSTEMS 
1. Hawk Missile 
The HAWK surface to air missile system provides medium range, low-to-medium 
altitude air defense against various threats. This system can be used against aircraft and 
cruise missiles. It is mobile and can operate in all-weather conditions during night and 
day. It is highly lethal, reliable, and effective against electronic countermeasures. The 
Hawk was originally named for the predatory bird, but later the name was turned into an 
acronym for "Homing All the Way Killer." [160] 
 
Table 13.   Hawk Specification (From [160]) 
  
Contractor Raytheon 
Mission surface-to-air missile defense 
Targets  
Length 12.5 feet (3.81 meters) 
Diameter 13.5 inches (3.84 centimeters) 
Weight 1400 pounds (635 kilograms) 
Range Officially: 14.9 miles (24 kilometers) 
40 km, in excess of 20 NM 
Speed Officially: Supersonic
800 m/sec, in excess of mach 2.4 
Altitude Officially: 30,000 feet (9.14 kilometers)
in excess of 60 KFT 
Propulsion Solid propellant rocket motor 
Guidance system Radar directed semi-active homing 
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Warheads One 300 pound (136.2 kg) high explosive missile 
Type of fire Operator directed/automatic modes 
Magazine capacity 48 missiles/battery 
Missile guidance Semi-active homing 
Target detection Continuous wave radar and pulse acquisition radars 
Target tracking High power illuminating continuous wave radar and passive optical 
Rate of fire 1 missile every 3 seconds 
Basic load on vehicle 3 missile towed launcher 
Reaction time, sec 35 
Reload time 10 min 
Emplace/displace time (min) 45 min emplacement 
Sensors High power continuous wave radar (HIPIR) 
Continuous wave acquisition radar (CWAR) 
Pulse Acquisition Radar (PAR) and passive optical scan 
Detection range, km 80 
  
Deployment One Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion in each Marine Air Control Group of 
each Marine Air Wing (two active, one Reserve).  
Firing Platoon: 2 Fire sections of 
up to 3 Launchers per (1) PAR and (1) CWAR 
3 missiles per launcher 
Units 2 active duty and 1 reserve Light Anti-aircraft Missile Battalion 






Figure 119.   MIM-23 Hawk (From [161]) 
 
2. Patriot Missile 
The Patriot missile is equipped with a track-via-missile (TVM) guidance system. 
The engagement control center (ECC), which is mobile, transmits correction data to the 
guidance system. 
The target acquisition system in the missile acquires the target in the terminal 
phase of flight and transmits the data using the TVM downlink via the ground radar to the 
engagement control station (ECS) for final course correction calculations. The course 




Figure 120.   MIM-104 Patriot (From [162]) 
 
a. Major Components  
• Phased array radar. The radar is very difficult to jam. The 
AN/MPQ-53/65 Radar Set is a passive electronically scanned array 
radar equipped with IFF, electronic counter-countermeasure 
(ECCM) and track-via-missile (TVM) guidance subsystems.  
• Engagement Control Station (ECS). Uses computerized decision 
aids. Man-machine interaction options here can range from letting 
the computer assist in target identification and prioritization to 
leaving the ECS and letting the computer fight the entire air battle 
itself.  
• 6 to 8 missile launchers. The launcher can be located up to 1 
kilometer away from the ECS/radar, receiving commands 
automatically via microwave data link.  
• Patriot missile that can outmaneuver any manned aircraft and most 
missiles is controlled in flight automatically by the computer [163]. 
 
Additionally, The OE-349 Antenna Mast Group (AMG) is mounted on an 
M927 5-Ton Cargo Truck. It includes four 4 kW antennas in two pairs on remotely 
controlled masts. The antennas can be controlled in azimuth, and the masts can be 
190 
 
elevated up to 100 feet 11 inches above ground level. Mounted at the base of each pair of 
antennas are two high-power amplifiers associated with the antennas and the radios in the 
collocated shelter. It is through these antennas that the ECS and ICC send their respective 
UHF "shots" in order to create the PADIL network [164]. 
 
Table 14.   Patriot Specifications (From [165]) 
 PAC - 1 PAC - 2 PAC - 3 
Type Land-mobile, 
surface-    
to-air guided 
weapon system 





Length 5.3 m 5.18 m 5.2 m 
Diameter 41 cm 41 cm 25 cm 
Wingspan  92 cm 50 cm 
Fins  four delta shaped fins   
Launch 
Weight 
914 kg 900 kg 312 kg 
Propulsion Single-stage 
solid    
propellant rocket 
motor  
Single-stage solid   
propellant rocket 
motor 
Single-stage solid    
propellant rocket 













with TVM and semi-
active homing 




Warhead HE    
single 90 kg 









Max speed Supersonic    
(in excess of 
Mach 3) 
Mach 5 Mach 5 
Max range 70 km 70-160km 15 km 
Min range NA 3 km -- 










There are many missions on the border between Xland and Yland but we will be 
interested in only one.  
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The main target in this mission is the nuclear plant where Yland conducts nuclear 
weapons research. This will be a surprise attack.  Formation PANTHER will destroy the 
main target with LGBs, attempting to minimize collateral damage. 
The second target is the Patriot SAM in the corridor, which will be destroyed by 
PUMA. TIGER will destroy the Hawk SAM that is in the same corridor. FALCON1 and 
FALCON2 are the sweep escorts, two minutes in front of the main package. EAGLE is 
the detached escort. FALCONs and EAGLE carry decoys, which are basically repeaters 
deployed to provide a target of selectable Radar Cross-Section to validate the masking 
performance of the jammer against enemy aircraft radar and AIM-120 AMRAAM. The 
main package carries the same type of repeater decoys in case something goes wrong and 
they need to deploy them for self defense against SAM or air-to-air interceptors. When it 
is necessary, they will deploy DECOY TACTIC AGAINST SAM and AIR 






Figure 121.   Attack Group 
 
2 min 




Figure 122.   Main Target and Panther’s Flight Plan 
 




Figure 124.   Patriot to Be Destroyed By Puma and Flight Plan 
 
The package is supported by a C-130 loaded with EA, ES and a relay UAS. The 
UAS will be deployed from the aircraft. Operators are onboard the C-130. EA UAS are 
equipped with noise jammers to be used against the Hawk system. UAS are going to be 
in a position to deploy DOUBLE SHORT RANGE MINI-UAS—EA MISSION (Tactic 
2) seven minutes before the main package gets in the SAM ring. The ES UAS are going 
to collect signals from the unseen area behind the mountains without being detected by 
enemy radar. They are going to do MULTIPLE SHORT RANGE MINI-UAS FOR 
THREAT WARNING-UNKNOWN THREAT—ES MISSION (Tactic 7). 
From the north, special operation teams will deploy other EA UAS to use the 
same tactic against the Patriot SAM. They will also be in position seven minutes before 
the main package crosses the SAM ring. They are equipped with similar noise jammers, 
transmitting in a different frequency that is effective against the Patriot. Further north, 
special operation teams cross the border and deploy ES UAS for signal collection for 
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immediate action. Since the intelligence expects A/A interceptors from the north, special 
forces UAS operators will launch ES UAS with direction finding capability especially for 
interceptors that will deploy MULTIPLE SHORT RANGE MINI-UAS FOR 
DIRECTION FINDING-KNOWN THREAT—ES MISSION (Tactic 8).  
 
Figure 125.   C-130 Loiter Pattern 
 
Predators armed with Hellfire will be flying ready to accomplish the SEAD 
mission in case there is any problem with the EA missions. Predators are there as a 
backup force.  
F. X-DAY 
05:50 a.m.  
Special Forces will take their place and will get ready for launching the UAS. 
05:55 a.m. 




Falcon1, Falcon2, Tiger, Puma, Panther, and Eagle take off from the north jet 
base in this order.  
06:05 a.m. 
C-130 will have established in holding and start deploying UAS. In the meantime, 
attack and escort groups will be halfway through the first check point. Special Forces 
deploy the UAS. 
 






Figure 127.   6:05 a.m. 
 
06:10 a.m. 
All the UAS are in position and they start EA by jamming the radars. 
06:15 a.m. 
All the aircrafts cross the border and get in to the SAM ring. Since the jammer 








Figure 128.   06:15 a.m. Flight Package 
 




Each formation passes its relevant IP point. ES UAS from the north get signal for 
incoming four scramble interceptors coming from north. Falcon1 and Falcon2 direct 
toward north. Falcon leader will take the best position to defeat the A/A interceptors 
depending on the directives coming from CAOC, which takes the necessary information 
from ES UAS.  
 
Figure 130.   06:18 a.m. 
 




Figure 131.   Possible A/A Engagement 
 
Even though there are many possible tactics for A/A engagement, it is certain that 
decoys will create an advantage and spoil the scramble aircrafts’ plan.  
06:19 a.m. 
Bombs on target. Patriot is destroyed by PUMA. After getting the confirmation, 
special forces bring back the EA UAS and start to pack up and get ready to leave quickly 
and quietly. If PUMA fails, EA UAS will stay inside the ring for protection of 
PANTHER and Predators will do the SEAD mission for the success of PANTHER as a 
backup plan. 
06:22 a.m. 
Bombs on target. HAWK is destroyed by TIGER. EA UAS will be brought back 
to the pre-determined point in Xland territory where they can be picked up. If TIGER 
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fails, EA UAS will stay inside the ring for protection of PANTHER and Predators will do 
the SEAD mission for the success of PANTHER as a backup plan. 
06:25 a.m. 
Bombs on target for the main target. PANTHER successfully dropped the bombs. 
TIGER is on the way back and PUMA has already crossed the border.  
 
Figure 132.   06:25 a.m. Bombs On Target-Mission Accomplished 
 
06:35 a.m. 
The entire package crosses the border and they are safe. All of the UAS turn back. 
Special Forces head back to base. C-130 and back-up Predators are also heading back. 
After a successful engagement with small or no loss, escort package is turning back 




Figure 133.   06:35 a.m. Entire Air Force Is Back In Xland Territory 
 
This scenario is clearly a transition of the UAS in the battle area in coordination 
with manned aircraft. In the near future, UAS will be able to accomplish all parts of this 
mission and there will not be any need for manned aircraft. Furthermore, there is a 
general belief that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the last manned aircraft and will 
eventually be replaced by unmanned aircraft. This scenario definitely shows us how to 
use the possible tactics in the net-centric battlefield. Many more scenarios can be 






IX. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION   
The recent meteoric rise of UAS development highlights the issue of the growing 
importance of UAS in the future and leads to the corollary issue of whether UAVs will 
replace manned aircraft roles and missions. UAS will allow for operations to be executed 
quickly, safely, and cheaply. UAS have proven their combat worth in many operations 
like Vietnam, Bekaa Valley, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Kosovo and Afghanistan.  
UAS will continue to replace manned aircraft in many areas, but only time and 
technology will tell how much. 
In parallel with UAS development, EW technology also is improving rapidly. 
With the beginning of the 20th century, EW started appearing “in-theater.” In WWI and 
especially in WWII this rise was drastic. After WWII, this incline increased faster. 
During many wars, all nations came to understand the importance of this new concept to 
defeat the enemy. It was a competition to gain the power. WWI, WWII, Vietnam, Korea, 
Bekaa Valley, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Kosovo and Afghanistan are the major 
conflicts in which we can see widespread use of EW that obviously affected the results.  
EW equipment can be manufactured cheaper and smaller to fit on to UAS. UAS 
in the EW environment are getting more important, since EW has become the heart of 
today’s net-centric warfare. UAS are very good platforms for EW—especially mini UAS, 
as they have started to play a major role because they are too small to be noticed by 
hostile radar systems and they are cheaper. With improving networking capabilities, these 
UAS can be controlled from a remote operation center and can send almost real-time data 
back for decision makers or field and operation commanders. 
In this thesis, reviewing both the history of UAS and EW gives the reader a bigger 
field of view for a better understanding of the merging points of these two concepts. 





achievements in the real world operations throughout this thesis. It must not be forgotten 
that if we cannot learn lessons from our past we are condemned to make similar mistakes 
in the future.  
Obviously, this thesis has a purpose of merging UAS and EW on the same path 
and developing tactics for operational use. Many more tactics should be developed and 
run in a scenario in real or simulated operations to get the best results.  
All the tactics in this thesis depend on assumptions, and they have not been field 
tested. There are many variables that would have an effect on which tactic should be 
chosen: geographical conditions, properties of the radar intended to be jammed, EW 
equipment mounted on the UAS, specifications of the UAS used for the mission—even 
the experience level of the UAS operator is a great factor while determining the proper 
tactics. 
Furthermore, during my thesis research with the COASTS program, I had a 
chance to work with several types of UAS: Raven, Wasp, Puma from Aeroviroment and 
CyberDefense’s Cyberbug. All these UAS were designed for surveillance, but whatever 
the mission is the platforms are almost the same; this was a good opportunity for me to 
evaluate UAS in a field environment. This opportunity revealed some untold facts about 
the UAS.  Even though UAS have many advantages and there is a very rapid 
improvement in UAS technology, they still have some disadvantages and drawbacks. 
Despite being built for harsh environments and almost all weather conditions, they can be 
unexpectedly fragile. While working with them I learned a very important lesson: while 
flying a UAS one should always have a spare for every UAS part, and a spare (at least 
one) UAS in its entirety. 
UAS have been the most dynamic growth sector of the aerospace industry this 
decade. Market studies estimate that the market will double over the next decade, from 
current worldwide UAS procurement expenditures of about $4.4 billion to $8.7 billion 




Table 15.   Future UAS Forecasts 
 
 
Frost & Sullivan note that defense ministries worldwide are set to allocate 
approximately four percent, equating to U.S. $36 billion, of their total defense 
procurement and budget toward electronic warfare (EW) over the next ten years. The 
U.S. alone is forecast to spend U.S. $25 billion on EW during this timeframe. Airborne 
countermeasures are predicted to account for 50 percent of total EW expenditure [167]. 
As shown in the table, there will be an increasing amount of investment on UAS 
in the next ten years and beyond. And it is fairly obvious that EW also will still keep its 
importance.  
Sooner or later, operational tactics development will gain greater importance. This 




EW needs UAS and UAS needs EW. This potentially synergistic relationship can 
provide the operators and commanders an enhanced situational awareness, a significantly 
superior capacity to conduct EW operations, and much more capable operational UAS. 
Miniature and mini UAS are of particular interest to EW operations, as these UAS 
are likely to undertake some of the dullest, dirty, dangerous, and nearly impossible 
missions. The affordability of these smaller UAS also provides us with the opportunity to 
acquire or develop suitable payloads for these missions. In addition, it allows for the 
development, experimentation, and evaluation of operational concepts for the larger 
UAVs and more advanced concepts and tactics. 
Finally, the future lies under the shadow of the unmanned systems. Whoever 
builds and controls them the best will play the biggest role in the political and military 
arena. This thesis can be used as a reference for future research to build more advanced 
tactics and concepts. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is certain that, in the near future, UAS are going to be one of the major players. 
Likewise, EW will be holding a critical place on the battle field. Almost all nations are 
budgeting for UAS development and EW research. We are in the information age, and no 
information is unreachable. Leading nations in UAS manufacturing sell their technology 
on the international market. Everyone is going to take part in the game. All these facts 
increase the importance of operational tactics development for these technologies. It is 
time for doctrine, strategy, concepts of operations (CONOPs) and tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTPs) to catch up to the technology that is available and ever more present. 
This thesis is a starting point for developing tactics for the integration of EW into 
mini-UAS operations. I tried to look at the subject from a wide perspective. Follow-on 





Every tactic has a weak point; follow-on research may also focus on this issue to 
uncover the weaknesses of the tactics displayed in this thesis. 
The wide historical research accomplished in the writing of this thesis might be 
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